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INTRODUCTION
Not all statutes are created equal. Appropriations laws perform
important public functions, but they are usually short-sighted and
have little effect on the law beyond the years for which they
apportion public monies.1 Most substantive statutes adopted by
Congress and state legislatures reveal little more ambition: they cover
narrow subject areas or represent legislative compromises that are
short-term fixes to bigger problems and cannot easily be defended as
the best policy result that can be achieved.2 Some statutes reveal
ambition but do not penetrate deeply into American norms or
institutional practice. Even fewer statutes successfully penetrate
public normative and institutional culture in a deep way. These last
are what we call super-statutes.
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1. Indeed, the Supreme Court has created a presumption against construing
appropriations laws to effect any change in substantive federal law. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978).
2. These statutes are legion. For two very different examples, compare the Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-24, 97 Stat. 175 (1983) (requiring the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to report every three years on the “addictive property of
tobacco”—a pallid response to the deadly effects of the drug nicotine), with the Hawaii
Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 2786, Act 383 (H.B. 118) (creating a new
institution of “reciprocal beneficiaries” open to couples who cannot marry—namely, same-sex
and couples related to one another—as part of a compromise that overrode constitutional
arguments for same-sex marriage but did not satisfy the long-term demand for state recognition
of same-sex relationships).
For an example of an aspiring super-statute, the success of which is dubious, see the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66.
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A super-statute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to
establish a new normative or institutional framework for state policy
and (2) over time does “stick” in the public culture such that (3) the
super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a
broad effect on the law—including an effect beyond the four corners
of the statute. Super-statutes are typically enacted only after lengthy
normative debate about a vexing social or economic problem, but a
lengthy struggle does not assure a law super-statute status. The law
must also prove robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over time,
such that its earlier critics are discredited and its policy and principles
become axiomatic for the public culture. Sometimes, a law just gets
lucky, catching a wave that makes it a super-statute. Other times, a
thoughtful law is unlucky, appearing at the time to be a bright
solution but losing its luster due to circumstances beyond the
foresight of its drafters.
Super-statutes are applied in accord with a pragmatic
methodology that is a hybrid of standard precepts of statutory,
common law, and constitutional interpretation.3 Although the courts
do not have to consider the super-statute beyond the four corners of
its plain meaning, they will often do so because the super-statute is
one of the baselines against which other sources of law—sometimes
including the Constitution itself—are read. Ordinary rules of
construction are often suspended or modified when such statutes are
interpreted. Super-statutes tend to trump ordinary legislation when
there are clashes or inconsistencies, even when principles of
construction would suggest the opposite. Occasionally, super-statutes
can reshape constitutional understandings. Because super-statutes
exhibit this kind of normative gravity, they have sufficient attraction
to bend and reshape the surrounding landscape. Super-statutes do not
always trump other sources of law, however, in part because they may
clash not only with the Constitution but also with other superstatutes.
As we shall explain in the first part of this paper, super-statutes
occupy the legal terrain once called “fundamental law,” foundational
principles against which people presume their obligations and rights
are set, and through which interpreters apply ordinary law. Today,

3. To overstate a bit, super-statutes become axiomatic for legislatures as well as courts.
Just as Congress would not dare (because of ridicule) adopt a law directing the citizenry to
accept that 2 + 2 = 5, so it would not dare pass a law repealing the Sherman Act and allowing
price fixing.
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this kind of law might be considered “quasi-constitutional”—
fundamental and trumping like constitutional law, but more tentative
and susceptible to override or alteration by the legislature or
determined judges and administrators. The third part of this paper
will explore the implications of this idea for modern public law. For
example, super-statutes are related to other phenomena in public law,
such as canons of statutory construction reflecting constitutional
precepts. They also bear interesting resemblance to, and can be
contrasted with, theories by which the Constitution itself evolves
outside of the formal amendment process of Article V.
Although they do not exhibit the super-majoritarian features of
Article V constitutional amendments and are not formally ratified by
the states, the laws we are calling super-statutes are both principled
and deliberative and, for those reasons, have attracted special
deference and respect. Indeed, the super-statute idea suggests a
source of legitimacy for changes in fundamental law that is different
from the formalism of Article V and the functional-formalism of
“constitutional moments” theory. Legitimate change in fundamental
law rarely occurs in a moment and sometimes comes over a period of
several decades. An amendment may pass through the formal
channels of Article V and not fundamentally change the way we
understand the law, and a constitutional showdown (moment) may
result in the triumph of a particular norm that does not stick.
Contrariwise, a statutory scheme that reflects longstanding
deliberation and announces a great principle sometimes sticks in the
public culture in ways that more dramatic events do not. The
legitimacy of treating these schemes as more normatively powerful
than ordinary statutes rests upon something more than their great
principles and their legislative deliberation. They are legitimated by
the feedback from the populace, experts, and officials that allows
these super-statutes to sink deeply into our normative consciousness.
I. AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO SUPER-STATUTES AND HOW
THEY FIT WITHIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Although we are deploying the term “super-statute” in a novel
way,4 the core idea is a familiar one in the history of Anglo-American
4. The term “super-statute” has been used by legal commentators before, but not in the
precise way we deploy the term here. Earlier writers have used the term to describe a
constitution, e.g., A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 122 (1968) (stating that American lawyers in the eighteenth
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law. The concept that certain statutes become axiomatic to a state’s
fundamental law can be traced back at least as far as early modern
English legal theory and was implicit in some statutory schemes
throughout American history. It is not until the New Deal, however,
that the super-statute phenomenon became a big feature of American
public law. The power of this idea continues even, and one might
even say especially, in the post–New Deal era of the Rehnquist
Supreme Court.
A. The English Background
As an historical matter, writers have sometimes contrasted
common law (English) systems with civil law (Roman) systems in the
following way.5 The baseline in civil law has traditionally been the
code, which judges treat as a comprehensive body of rules, policies,
and principles. Gaps in the code are filled in by a process civilians call
the equity of the statute: judges reason by analogy from the most
pertinent provision and its policy to supply the answer in the casus
omissus, the unprovided-for case. New laws are integrated into the
code either by the legislature and its drafters or by judges who
reconcile its rules and policies with those of the code. The baseline in
common law systems has traditionally been the common law, a
comprehensive body of rules, policies, and principles. Gaps in the
common law are filled by a process of reasoning by analogy, figuring
out how a new problem is akin to, and different from, prior judicial
determinations. New laws are integrated into the common law
through two simple canons: ordinary statutes will be construed
consistent with the common law and not in derogation of it, but
remedial statutes might supersede the common law and be construed
to trump it.
The foregoing contrast between civil and common law treatment
of statutes is, of course, a great overstatement today. Interestingly,

century viewed the Magna Carta and the common law it was thought to embody “as a kind of
superstatute, a constitution placing fundamental liberties beyond the reach of Parliament”), or,
simply, a big statute with no force outside its four corners, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman,
Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 522 (1989) (“Superstatutes do not
seek to revise any of the deeper principles organizing our higher law; instead, they content
themselves with changing one or more rules without challenging basic premises.”). We owe
these references to David Fontana, Yale Law School Class of 2002.
5. The rough contrast in text is drawn from JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION (2d ed. 1988); INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
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the contrast was never so striking, even in prior eras. Mathew Hale’s
treatise on the History of the Common Law of England distinguished
between statutes enacted before the reign of King Richard I and
those enacted afterwards.6 Hale observed that the former were laws
“before Time of Memory” because their records had been lost.
Nonetheless, many of those early statutes “are now accounted part of
the Lex non Scripta, being as it were incorporated into, and become a
Part of the Common Law.”7 Such statutes “obtain their Strength by
meer immemorial Usage or Custom.”8 Many statutes enacted during
the “Time of Memory” had a similar fate, either because they were
codifications of the common law or because they “made a Change in
the Common Law,” but “are yet so ancient, that they now seem to
have been as it were a Part of the Common Law, especially
considering the many Expositions that have been made of them in the
several Successions of Times, whereby as they became the great
Subject of Judicial Resolutions and Decisions.”9
Thus, the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Uses both changed the
common law and became objects of evolution and judicial
elaboration, common law–style.
Hale’s treatise provides an historical precedent for two of the
three features of super-statutes: they aspire toward changing the
common law baseline, and they actually have that effect over time,
which in turn means that they become the object of evolution and
debate among judges as well as legislators. Our third feature of superstatutes is their expansive, imperial interpretation. That is not a
matter that interested Hale, but other early English sources explored
the question of how fundamental statutes ought to be construed.
A leading statement of precepts for interpreting statutes in the
early modern period is Heydon’s Case.10 King Henry VIII broke with
the Roman Catholic Church and established the Church of England
as a separate faith. This break was accompanied by the seizure of
Catholic Church property by the state. A statute listed specific
property transfer devices that would be disregarded if used to avoid
the king’s seizure of Church property. The statute did not list
copyhold interests, which were used to transfer Church property in

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 9 (3d ed. 1739).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 9.
76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. 1584).
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Heydon’s Case. The court laid out its theory of interpreting statutes.
First, consider the common law, the “mischief” that the common law
did not solve, and the remedy devised by the legislature. Then, judges
should “make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions
for continuance of the mischief.”11 Because the statute of Henry VIII
sought to block evasions of the royal confiscations, the judges
extended its ambit to include property interests that had been
inadvertently omitted. The judges in Heydon’s Case followed a broad
remedial interpretative approach to help the legislator accomplish all
he was trying to accomplish. Heydon’s Case was a celebrated decision,
and the remedial approach it exemplified was often deployed by
English judges and celebrated by the commentators.12 Blackstone
referred favorably to Heydon’s Case as an important statutory
interpretation precedent,13 and he adopted this form of the mischief
rule: “[T]he most universal and effectual way of discovering the true
meaning of the law, when its words are dubious, is by considering the
reason and spirit of it . . . for when this reason ceases, the law itself
ought likewise to cease with it.”14 This is the same Blackstone who
firmly believed that the common law remained the ordinary baseline
because of its elegant coherence and overall superiority to statutory
law.
B. The Founding and Consolidating Periods of American History
Virtually any lawyer in the American colonies was familiar with
Blackstone, and most probably knew about Hale and Heydon’s Case
as well. As historians Gordon Wood and Jack Rakove have
documented, the founding period (1776-1789) saw thoughtful
Americans struggle with dueling notions of popular sovereignty and
judicial independence protecting established liberties.15 State
11. Id. at 638.
12. E.g., 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW *647 (W. Strahan, 4th
ed. 1778) (1736); SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND: OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 21, at 24.b (Luke Hansard & Sons 16th
ed. 1809) (1628). Compare WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 14-15 (2000) (taking a
broad view of Heydon’s Case), with S.E. Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon’s Case, 31
ILL. L. REV. 202, 215-17 (1936) (viewing Heydon’s Case as influential but not as bold as Popkin
views it).
13. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *87 (21st ed.
1862).
14. 1 id. at 60.
15. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
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constitutions emphasizing the former yielded chaotic and frequently
unjust legislation, and the Framers and defenders of the Constitution
emphasized the role of the “judicial power” to contain the Congress
and assure the rule of law.16 Generally, the founding period did not
focus specifically on the liberal application of statutes entailed in Hale
and Heydon’s Case. Nonetheless, three general principles embodied
in the Constitution and discussed during the ratification debates lend
some support to the proposition that the new government was one
where statutes should sometimes be considered sources of
fundamental law.
First, the Constitution committed the federal government to
popular sovereignty—“We the People” are the governors as well as
the governed.17 Popular sovereignty is hostile to a judge-created
common law as the only basis for the rule of law, and the principle
suggests that there ought to be some role for popular feedback in the
process by which certain legal notions become fundamental law.
Second, the Constitution committed the national government to
lawmaking by elected representatives deliberating for the public
good. Article I’s vesting legislative authority in Congress and Article
III’s vesting the Supreme Court and inferior federal courts with
jurisdiction to interpret federal statutes (and only implicit jurisdiction
to hear federal common law claims) suggest the principle that the
primary source of law at the federal level would be statutes—a
striking contrast to England and the states, where Blackstonian
common law precedents remained the main source of law.18 That
members of Congress were accountable directly to the people
(House) and the states (Senate) meant that law would be subjected to
popular influence.

MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
16. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Original Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2001).
17. RAKOVE, supra note 15, at 97-101. This was in striking contrast to England, where
Parliament asserted itself as sovereign; the revolting colonists rejected this model. Martin
Flaherty, Note, The Empire Strikes Back: Annesly v. Sherlock and the Triumph of Imperial
Parliamentary Supremacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 619 (1987).
18. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1498-1503 (1987) (explaining that statutes were expected to be the primary source of federal law
but that judges were expected to follow common law reasoning from statutes in appropriate
cases); Thomas Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7-8
(1985) (arguing that federal courts were expected to have no common law power).
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It is straightforward to deduce from these first two constitutional
principles the proposition that statutes aspiring to create broader
norms and structures for governance and showing robustness over
time ought to be applied liberally (so long as they do not bump up
against other sources of fundamental law, such as the Constitution).
That deduction is not inevitable, however, for the Framers might have
wanted as little law as possible, which would militate against any
source of law being applied broadly.19 A third constitutional principle
presses us away from that possibility—but only for certain kinds of
statutes. The Framers of the Constitution rejected the Articles of
Confederation primarily because they failed to permit energetic
governance at the national level.20 Within their listed spheres of
unique national competence—such as interstate commerce,
bankruptcy, and foreign affairs (all listed in Article I, Section 8)—the
Framers wanted Congress to be able to act decisively and to shift the
terrain away from common law baselines if required for energetic
governance in the public interest. Most of the time, this can be
accomplished by normal legislation responding to parochial problems
or addressing larger problems in a piecemeal way. The Constitution’s
structure and the expectations of the Framers left room for Congress
to act in a bigger way, however, and with more pervasive effects on
public norms.21

19. See generally John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 78-85 (2001) (discussing founding-period criticism of “equitable” interpretation such as
that in Heydon’s Case).
20. DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 35-58 (1984);
RAKOVE, supra note 15, at 191.
21. Thus, both Article I, Section 7 statutes and Article II treaties are entitled to supremacy
in state as well as federal courts, Article VI, meaning that they trump the common law regimes
still prevailing at the state level. The Framers also anticipated that federal statutes would
conflict with one another (and sometimes with the Constitution), with courts arbitrating these
clashes. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Specifically, Hamilton wrote, “whenever a particular statute contravenes the constitution, it will
be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.” Id.
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The first Congresses adopted few super-statutes.22 One was the
law creating the Bank of the United States,23 which was adopted only
after a great normative debate. Hamilton and his allies maintained
that a federal bank was necessary to operate the government in an
orderly manner and to foster commerce and industry in the new
Republic, while Jefferson and his allies maintained that the Bank was
ultra vires the national government and contrary to the Arcadian
republic of small farmers and shopkeepers that they envisioned.24 The
arguments against the Bank’s constitutionality were those of normal
interpretation. Because a federal bank would go well beyond the
common law and would be inconsistent with state statutes, such a
power needed to be named explicitly in Article I, Section 8’s
comprehensive listing of national powers, which, of course, it was
not.25 Defending the Bank, Hamilton started from a different
interpretive baseline. The Constitution should be interpreted to carry
out its ambitious purposes, and so Article I’s grant of power needed
to be “construed liberally” to support a national bank.26
This debate within the national cabinet and legislature prefigured
an enduring contrast between laws that have dramatically shifted
national policy or norms and those which have followed or marginally
altered common law and other well-trod furrows. Most proposals for
dramatic shifts have in fact been defeated, but Hamilton persuaded
the President to support his plan for the Bank of the United States,
22. Most of the laws adopted in the first Washington administration were short measures
addressing particular issues of maritime regulation, taxation and licensing, federal-state
relations, and the mechanics of the new federal government. Some of these laws could be
characterized as super-statutes. The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, for
example, set forth the structure and jurisdiction of the federal courts. It was a foundational
statute and established a number of enduring policies. Most notable was the policy of § 34, the
Rules Decision Act, now 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994), which required federal courts to apply state
law in diversity cases. In this respect, the 1789 law was a super-statute, because it was more than
structural; from its beginning, it represented a great principle of federalism. Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-73 (1938) (interpreting the Rules Decision Act to require federal
courts to apply state common law in diversity cases).
23. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191.
24. The debate about the Bank is told in Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the
Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 358-71
(1989) (explaining the Framers’ intentions and views concerning the Bank’s constitutionality).
25. 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 284-89 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895)
(cataloguing Jefferson’s view that the Bank was beyond the boundaries, both specific and
general, enumerated in the Constitution).
26. 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 105 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965). For an
excellent discussion, see David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The
Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 796-819 (2001).
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which operated successfully for two generations. The law met the first
criterion for super-statutes in setting an important national policy,
and the second for enduring (albeit not for as long as most of the
other super-statutes discussed in this paper). The national bank policy
stuck in public culture in ways other Hamiltonian policies did not.
When the first Act expired in 1815, Congress voted to renew the
institution, but President Madison vetoed the law for practical
reasons. Even though he had vigorously opposed the Bank for
constitutional reasons in 1791, Madison in 1815 accepted its
legitimacy but not its necessity. He reconsidered the latter conclusion
in the next year, and the Second Bank of the United States, which
lasted until the Jackson administration, was created in 1816.27
Whereas Madison and Jefferson had maintained that the Bank
must give way to the Constitution, it was ultimately the Constitution
that gave way to the Bank. By the time the issue finally reached the
Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland,28 Chief Justice John
Marshall was able to start his opinion with the observation that
decades of experience with and acquiescence in the Bank of the
United States gave it a heightened presumption of constitutionality.29
Not only did Marshall then proceed to sustain the Bank against
constitutional objections, but he set forth the most expansive theory
for interpreting the Constitution ever penned by a U.S. Supreme
Court Justice. After broadly construing Article I, Section 8, along the
purposive and liberal lines originally suggested by Hamilton,30
Marshall not only sustained the Bank’s constitutionality but also
invalidated Maryland’s effort to tax the Bank as unconstitutional.31
Presumably, the latter holding represented a judgment that state
taxation was inconsistent with the efficient operation of a federally
chartered bank—but that was a judgment made not on the face of the
statute but that Marshall teased out of the nature of things.
In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,32 Chief Justice Marshall
created out of the Bank’s authorizing statute an implied grant of
federal jurisdiction over lawsuits in which the Bank was a party.33 This
27. Bank of United States Act, ch. 44, § 7, 3 Stat. 266 (1816) (expired 1836).
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
29. Id. at 401-02.
30. Id. at 413-25 (interpreting the word “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause
broadly and concluding that the incorporation of the Bank was constitutional).
31. Id. at 425-37 (analyzing the constitutionality of the Maryland tax).
32. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
33. Id. at 828.
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was not only a dynamic construction of the statute, which said only
that the Bank could “sue or be sued” in state or federal circuit courts34
but was also a preface to another breathtaking interpretation of the
Constitution. Marshall construed Article III’s “arising under” grant of
jurisdiction to extend so far as to include cases where federal law is
“an ingredient” of the cause of action.35 All of this was extraordinary
and amounted to a dramatic judicial extension of both the statute and
the Constitution. Yet, as Justice Johnson’s dissent wearily observed:
I have very little doubt that the public mind will be easily reconciled
to the decision of the court here rendered . . . . The Bank of the
United States is now identified with the administration of the
national government. . . . [S]erious and very weighty doubts have
been entertained of its constitutionality, but they have been
36
abandoned . . . .

Although the Second Bank expired in 1836, its animating principles—
that the federal government could charter corporations and create
institutions to regularize and manage the nation’s finances—stuck in
the public culture.
The Civil War produced some putative super-statutes, namely
the Civil Rights Acts of 186637 and 1871.38 These statutes announced
great antidiscrimination principles but were narrowly construed by a
post-Reconstruction judiciary afraid to disturb the political consensus
in favor of racial segregation.39 Hence, these were failed superstatutes—until the post–World War II civil rights movement revived
interest in those laws and the Warren Court breathed new life into
34. Id. at 817-18 (asserting that the law permitting the Bank to sue and be sued in the
circuit courts of the United States was an implicit vesting of federal jurisdiction for any case
brought by the Bank and distinguishing Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
61, 85 (1809), which construed the first Bank authorization as not vesting federal courts with
jurisdiction over such lawsuits). Marshall’s statutory claim was vigorously disputed by Justice
Johnson’s dissenting opinion, Osborn, 22 U.S. at 871-84 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (following
Deveaux and suggesting anomalies created by the Court’s broad construction).
35. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823; see also id. at 818-28 (considering “the constitutionality of the
clause in the act of incorporation, which authorizes the bank to sue in the federal courts”).
36. Id. at 871-72 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
37. 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1994)).
38. 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)). A third statute, the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, was invalidated by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that Congress had no authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit private discrimination in public accommodations).
39. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 595 (1871) (holding the federal Civil Rights Act of
1866 did not supply jurisdiction to a criminal case, thereby allowing the Kentucky statute
prohibiting blacks from testifying against whites to apply).
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them in the 1960s with liberal interpretations.40 Dynamic readings
extended the 1871 Act to provide a remedy against state and local
governments for a range of federal constitutional and statutory rights
violations and allowed complainants to sue for broad injunctions and
damages that could include mental anguish, symbolic damages, and
even punitive damages.41 Although the Court has also set limits on
relief under the 1871 Act, the Act has altered the federal-state
balance in innumerable ways.42 It is now truly a super-statute, albeit
one whose morphogenesis was more delayed and twisted than most
others. Other laws originating in the post–Civil War period had more
immediate recognition as super-statutes: the Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887, the Sherman Act of 1890 (discussed below), and the Pure
Food & Drugs Act of 1906 (also discussed below).
C. The Modern Regulatory State
The same post-Reconstruction judiciary that construed the early
civil rights acts stingily protected common law baselines in a range of
other cases, especially labor cases.43 Surly judicial reception, however,
hardly deterred legislatures from creating myriad new laws.
Progressive supporters of the new legislation—critics of this common
law formalism—not only argued that the judiciary was wrong in
resisting humane and efficient employment policies but also argued
that the common law itself should no longer be the reflexive baseline
in the modern state.44 Expanding upon and updating Hale’s notion, a

40. E.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 702 (1978) (extending the 1871 Act to
allow suits against municipalities engaged in policies or customs that violate the Constitution);
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-44 (1968) (interpreting the 1866 Act to reach
private discrimination); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (establishing the 1871 Act to
allow suits against police officers). Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 243 (1964) revived the 1875 Act, see supra note 38, under Congress’s Commerce Clause
power rather than its Fourteenth Amendment authority.
41. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (allowing punitive damages); Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 264-66 (1978) (discussing symbolic damages and mental anguish).
42. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) (noting that critics of the
Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence believe it has overburdened the federal system, allowed plaintiffs
to bootstrap garden-variety state-law tort claims into federal court, and interfered in state
affairs).
43. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 81-107 (1994)
(examining the statutory labor injunction cases from the 1880s through the 1930s and finding a
persistence of common law baselines in judicial interpretations even of pro-labor statutes).
44. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 614 (1908) (“That
our case law at its maturity has acquired the sterility of a fully developed system, may be shown
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number of influential legal scholars maintained that courts ought to
consider statutes as a source of fundamental law. Thus Roscoe Pound
maintained that “legislative innovation” should afford courts “not
only a rule to be applied but a principle from which to reason, and
hold it, as a later and more direct expression of the general will, of
superior authority to judge-made rules on the same general subject.”45
Justice Harlan Stone agreed that “there is no adequate reason for our
failure to treat a statute much more as we treat a judicial precedent,
as both a declaration and a source of law, and as a premise for legal
reasoning.”46
These twentieth-century rationalists maintained that a pattern of
statutory enactments reflecting a particular normative stance could
shift fundamental law, which in turn could affect common law and
constitutional law. A majority of the Supreme Court was resistant to
this body of thought for several decades, but it became highly
influential during the New Deal, which created a wave of superstatutes—such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 193247 (a precursor of
the New Deal), the Securities Act of 1933,48 the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,49 the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,50 the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938,51 and others. The New Deal and
Warren Courts remolded constitutional law to accommodate these
statutes, gave them broad constructions, updated them when useful,
and drew from those laws principles to be applied in related cases,
such as preemption of state law. The period of 1938-69 might at first
glance be considered the golden age of the super-statute. It might
even be said that the New Deal and Warren Courts treated most
statutes like super-statutes.

by abundant examples of its failure to respond to vital needs of present-day life.”).
45. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385-86 (1908).
46. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12-13
(1936); see also James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 213, 214 (1934) (“[T]o admit the existence of wide areas for legal administration beyond
the direct governance of statutes is not to assume that statutes have no part in the solution of
problems impossible to bring within the reach of their terms.”). For an excellent analysis of the
legal “rationalists” of the 1920s and 1930s, see generally Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The
Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601 (1993).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78lll (1994).
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (1994).
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The overall jurisprudence of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
does not appear as friendly to the super-statute idea, at least at first
blush.52 Those Courts have evidenced a relative nostalgia for common
law baselines, purported to be more text-bound in their interpretation
of statutes, and have been more reluctant to derive principles from
federal statutes than the New Deal and Warren Courts were.53
Theoretically, the recent Court stance could be justified on grounds
of a formal theory of lawmaking, separation of powers, and
federalism. Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution deliberately makes
it hard to enact statutes and thereby makes it important that statutes
laden with compromises not be construed too liberally nor beyond
their textual plain meanings.54 Federalism might be read to suggest
that federal judges should not be eager to apply national statutes
broadly to preempt traditional state regulations.55 Separation of
powers suggests to some Justices that the Court does not have a
roaming power to update laws.56
The stylized formalism of the previous observations may be hard
to defend theoretically,57 and it is not always followed by the Court’s
moderate-conservative wing.58 Something more is going on, and it has
52. Superficially, one would expect a sea change. Thirty-six years of Supreme Court
appointments (1933-1969) by presidents who were either liberal Democrats or “me-too”
Republicans (Eisenhower), have been followed by thirty-six years of appointments (1969-2005)
by presidents who were either conservative Republicans or triangulating-centrist Democrats
(Clinton). As we shall see, the Court’s shift to the political right has only marginally affected its
overall approach to super-statutes.
53. For an overview, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court,
1993 Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 56-71 (1994).
54. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
738-39 (1997) (arguing that textualism is preferable to the authoritative use of legislative history
because no legislator votes on any piece of a statute’s legislative history).
55. See generally Merrill, supra note 18 (arguing that the Framers intended for federal
statutes to be applied according to their original meanings, in part because of the limitations of
federal judicial power).
56. E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 7-15 (1994) (arguing that separation of powers requires judges to apply statutes as they are
written).
57. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 18, at 1497-1511 (responding to Merrill, supra note 18);
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755-76 (1996)
(responding to Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 56); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The
Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1522-32 (1998) (reviewing SCALIA, supra note 56
(responding to the viewpoint held by Manning, supra note 54)); Marin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755-76 (1996).
58. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408-09 (1989) (upholding the Sentencing
Commission against a formalist challenge); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-94 (1988)
(upholding the Independent Counsel law); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478
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to do with the nation’s political culture.59 The New Deal and Warren
Courts operated in a public culture optimistic about the operation of
government creating statutes conducing toward the public good. Our
generation of law professors and judges lost that innocence, which has
partly been overtaken with a public-choice understanding of
government as a forum for rent-seeking by greedy groups. Under that
vision, laws the New Dealers considered rational and publicregarding have been re-presented as more narrowly conceived and
partial, at least at their birth. The Justices on the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts were all appointed by presidents who promised to
cut back on government, and some owed their jobs to administrations
that treated government as the enemy of the people.60
Just as the stringent formalism in constitutional understanding
has not swept the field, neither has the gloomiest public-choice
understanding of government. What we should like to emphasize,
however, is that neither the public-choice nor the formalist critique of
New Deal lawmaking applies as well to super-statutes as it does to
ordinary statutes. The intense public focus on super-statutes at
various points in their life cycles helps insulate them from the normal
politics of rent-seeking. Because super-statutes usually seek to change
common law baselines, and do so after an open process of public
debate and struggle, the constitutional formalism that trims back
efforts to elaborate ordinary statutes might actually support efforts to
elaborate super-statutes and apply them rather expansively.
Another key distinction between ordinary statutes and superstatutes is the durability of the latter over time. A statute that endures
criticism and finds useful application by a range of officials (judges,
executive branch officers, state officers) over time and across
U.S. 833, 858 (1986) (upholding the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s counterclaim
jurisdiction). The Court is more consistently formalist in federalism cases, but even there it is
hard to read the Court’s decisions as well-reasoned along formalist lines. Compare Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933-34 (1997) (holding that the federal government cannot compel
local or state law-enforcement officials to perform background checks on firearm purchasers),
with id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (showing the Court’s formalism to be unsupported by
formal sources such as the text of the Constitution and the Framers’ intent), and id. at 970
(Souter, J., dissenting) (same); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of
Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2256-57 (1998) (calling for a more nuanced
approach than strict formalism).
59. The account in the text that follows is taken from William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW li, cxxicxxv (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958).
60. See supra note 52.
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different administrations is one that we expect to be “worked pure”
of some of its glitches and give-aways. The key to super-statutedom is
acceptance in public culture. That cannot be mandated, nor is it
earned exactly. It is a trial-and-error process which, when successful,
creates its own gravitational field. This process can be derailed. Thus,
the Supreme Court’s periodically lethal formalism has felled several
congressional enactments that were putative super-statutes—most
notably, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,61 the Line Item
Veto Act,62 and an important portion of the Violence Against Women
Act.63 Once they have stuck in the public culture, however, laws do
not require the Court’s enthusiasm for their success—they command
it, often after a congressional correction of surly judicial constructions
of foundational statutes. For laws that have already proven their
super-statute status, the current Court has been acquiescent rather
than formalist in its approach, as we shall show in the next part. As
with previous Courts, the current one does have its own favored
super-statutes, a point that will emerge most clearly in the final part.
II. WHAT IS A SUPER-STATUTE?
EXAMPLES OF SUPER-STATUTES IN ACTION
There is bound to be disagreement as to whether or not a law is a
super-statute. Some laws are adopted with great fanfare but end up
having little or no lasting effect on national policy or public norms.
The national experiment with liquor prohibition is an example of a
constitutional amendment whose failure was quick and complete. The
national experiment with railroad regulation through filed tariffs is an
example of a statutory scheme whose failure came much later and
after long death-throes. Other statutes have lasted a long time. Are
they super-statutes? How can you tell?
As the examples of Prohibition and railroad tariffs suggest, the
test of a super-statute is neither how much public attention and
enthusiasm accompanies a law’s adoption nor how long the law lasts.
Our first criterion for super-statutes is that they alter substantially the
then-existing regulatory baselines with a new principle or policy. Our

61. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act on federalism grounds).
62. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (invalidating the Line Item Veto
Act on Article I, Section 7 and separation of powers grounds).
63. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating portions of the
Violence Against Women Act on federalism grounds).
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second criterion, however, can be judged only over a period of time:
the new principle or policy “sticks” in the public culture in a deep
way, becoming foundational or axiomatic to our thinking. In addition
to these two substantive ones, there is a procedural marker for superstatutes, for they are generated in a reflective and deliberative
manner over a long period of time. Typically, a super-statute is not
just a snap response to a fleeting crisis; instead, it emerges after a
lengthy period of public discussion and official deliberation. More
important, the super-statute that emerges from Congress is not a
completed product. It requires elaboration from administrators and
judges, whose work is then subject to meaningful scrutiny and
correction by the legislature or even the citizenry. This feedback loop
is an essential feature of super-statutes, but its operation is variegated
and impossible to predict. Each super-statute has a pre-enactment
history and a post-enactment history that are as important as—and
usually more important than—its enactment history.
In light of these criteria, consider three very different kinds of
super-statutes and a capsule history of the elaboration of their
principles. Our first example is a market-regulatory law that had an
inauspicious genesis and early history but has evolved into one of the
most successful super-statutes in the nation’s history. The second
example is our leading civil rights law, which was hailed as a superstatute from the beginning, but its principle has been subject to
continual debate as to how it applies to unanticipated social
circumstances. The third example is an environmental law designed to
be a super-statute and embodying a great principle, but its future as a
super-statute is not as clear as the first two because of doubts about
the means Congress adopted to effectuate the principle.
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
The Sherman Act of 1890,64 prohibiting combinations and
conspiracies “in restraint of trade,” as well as monopolies, is a classic
super-statute. Scholars are divided as regards the actual goals of the
Act’s framers, but most agree that the law was broadly enabling, as it
implicitly authorized the judiciary and the Department of Justice to
learn how markets work and to formulate rules and standards
facilitating their operation and discouraging anticompetitive

64.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
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practices.65 That the law was enabling did not mean that it would
work, and the early history of the Sherman Act is filled with false
steps and odd decisions. It was a political struggle to get the law
enacted; it proved to be an even greater struggle to develop
precedents with bite against business combinations and practices that
sound economic theory posits as restraining trade and impairing the
efficient functioning of the market.66 Nonetheless, it is now widely
accepted that the Sherman Act does represent a great principle—
competition in a free market—and that its principle has penetrated
American law and society in a pervasive way.67
At the risk of abusing a metaphor, we believe that there was a
kind of invisible hand guiding the evolution of the Sherman Act
toward a robust economics-driven set of rules. Even though the
statutory language invoked a common law concept (restraint of trade)
and a jurisdictional requirement imposed by the Constitution (in or
affecting commerce), the statute’s inclusion of both public and private
causes of action (and a treble damages incentive for private actions)
created an ongoing economics-focused dialogue among judges,
executive branch officials, private attorneys, academics (especially
economists), and legislators and their staffs. The feedback loop
facilitated by that dialogue corrected ill-advised paths and pressed the
statutory scheme toward robust rules that have become deeply rooted
in American public law because they make sense. Consider some
examples of different feedback scenarios.
On the one hand, the Supreme Court’s early decisions refusing to
give the law a proper breadth were criticized and essentially reversed
in the political process during the first Roosevelt and Wilson
administrations.68 Sometimes the Court has reversed itself, overruling
65. E.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 53 (1994).
66. Standard histories include HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW
1836-1937 (1991); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT (1981); and HANS B. THORELLI, THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1955)
(acknowledged as the leading history of the Sherman Act).
67. That there is still debate as to the precise nature of that principle does not affect our
analysis or conclusion. At a high level of generality, the principle can be expressed as antipredation, the idea of free competition, and so forth. That is enough for our purposes.
68. E.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 30 (1912) (construing the Sherman Act not to
prohibit tying arrangements) (overridden in the Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994));
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) (construing the Sherman Act to be
inapplicable to the sugar trust). The E.C. Knight decision became a campaign issue in the 1896
election, and subsequently was rendered irrelevant by Sherman Act decisions written by judges
appointed after the election. E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 391-93 (1906)
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or narrowing prior decisions that have been subject to persuasive
economic critique.69 On the other hand, ill-advised congressional
amendments have been narrowly interpreted by the Court and
sometimes abandoned by the political process. Most of the ill-advised
amendments have been of the rent-seeking variety, where an industry
group procures an exemption from the public-benefit law. For
example, the Miller-Tydings Act of 193770 authorized the states to
permit resale price maintenance contracts, a congressional
authorization of practices that are usually anticompetitive. The
Supreme Court in 1952 gave the special-interest amendment a
narrowing construction, invalidating a Louisiana law requiring all
liquor retailers to charge the price set by the distributor once any
retailer agreed to the set price.71 Congress itself repealed the law in
1975. Other statutory exemptions have survived,72 but, as the Supreme
Court has said repeatedly, “exemptions from the antitrust laws are to
be narrowly construed.”73 Generally, the Court has interpreted the
amendments to minimize rent-seeking and to fit possibly valid
market-based reasons for alternative regulatory schemes. Thus, firms

(construing the Sherman Act broadly because the challenged conduct furthered the pursuit of
an interstate monopoly, unlike the challenged conduct in E.C. Knight, which furthered the
pursuit of a purely intrastate monopoly).
69. E.g., Cont. T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (overruling the rule
announced in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), that vertical
restrictions in sale transactions have a pernicious effect on competition and therefore constitute
a per se violation of the Sherman Act); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory
Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1426-40 (1988) (listing Supreme Court cases, including Sherman
Act cases, that overruled statutory precedent). Justice Stevens—the Court’s firmest adherent to
super-strong stare decisis in statutory cases—exempts Sherman Act cases from that rule because
the Sherman Act is a common law statute. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582,
641-62 n.12 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1).
71. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 388 (1952) (rejecting the
dissenting Justices’ argument that Congress clearly intended to reach these “nonsigner”
statutes).
72. E.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994)
(exempting insurance and leaving that industry to state regulation); Reed-Bulwinkle Act of
1948, 62 Stat. 472 (originally codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5b, recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 10706 (1994))
(exempting railroad and trucking rate bureau meetings); Clayton Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 731, 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1994) (exempting labor and agricultural organizations).
73. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231-32 (1979) (adopting
a narrow construction of the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1954); see also Fed. Maritime Comm’n
v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973) (narrowly construing § 15 of the Shipping Act);
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956) (strictly construing the
Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act).
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that engage in predatory conduct have not usually been able to hide
behind statutory exemptions.
The interpretive history of the Sherman Act provides a classic
illustration of the gravitational force a super-statute exercises on the
law, in contrast to that of other kinds of statutes. To begin with, a
super-statute will generally be applied in a purposive rather than
simple text-bounded or originalist way. It will generate a dynamic
common law implementing its great principle and adapting the statute
to meet the challenges posed to that principle by a complex society.
Although the Sherman Act centrally deploys the common law term
“restraint of trade” and its authors apparently thought they were
federalizing the common law, the leading precedents have not
confined the statute to those restraints which in 1890 were illegal
under the common law.74 Yale Law School Dean (and future Chief
Justice) Taft’s 1914 book on antitrust law openly endorsed the
Sherman Act’s dynamic application to address “the changes of
business and social conditions” as well as prevailing economic
norms.75 This was certainly the approach taken by the New Deal and
Warren Courts.76 Although the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
emphasized plain meanings and common law backgrounds in
statutory cases more than their predecessors, they have nonetheless
construed the Sherman Act in the purposive, evolutive way the New
Deal and Warren Courts did. Indeed, the boldest statement of this
methodology came from archtextualist Antonin Scalia, who, after
presenting an intricate economic analysis of a challenged vertical
restraint, had this to say about the statute:
In resting our decision upon the foregoing economic analysis, we do
not ignore common-law precedent concerning what constituted
“restraint of trade” at the time the Sherman Act was adopted. But
neither do we give that pre-1890 precedent the dispositive effect that
some would. The term “restraint of trade” in the statute, like the
74. For example, Judge Taft’s great decision in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211, 248 (1899), used and arguably distorted the
common law as a backdrop for principles grounded in sound economic reasoning. Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019,
1019 (1989) (arguing that, in 1890, the common law regarding competition was undergoing a
revolution as a result of the death of mercantilism and the rise of classicism).
75. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 47
(1914).
76. E.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497-99 (1940) (concluding that the
Sherman Act should be adapted to prevent modern conduct that caused the wrongs that the
common law doctrine of illegal restraints on trade and commerce was aimed to prevent).
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term at common law, refers not to a particular list of agreements,
but to a particular economic consequence, which may be produced
by quite different sorts of agreements in varying times and
circumstances. The changing content of the term “restraint of trade”
was well recognized at the time the Sherman Act was enacted. . . .
The Sherman Act adopted the term “restraint of trade” along with
its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not
merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the
77
term in 1890.

A second feature of a super-statute in action is that its principle
will have colonizing effects on other statutes. Given the Sherman
Act’s expansive reach, its operation potentially conflicts with any
statutory scheme regulating economic activity or an industry. From
the beginning, the Sherman Act has occupied a favored position as
the Supreme Court’s first major decision invalidating a railroad cartel,
rejecting the argument that the ICC’s regulation of rail transport
immunized the arrangement.78 The Court held that the Sherman Act
created an implied exception to the ICC’s otherwise exclusive
regulatory jurisdiction over railroads. What about statutes adopted
after the Sherman Act? Later-enacted statutes might alter the scope
of earlier ones (as the Sherman Act did vis-à-vis the Interstate
Commerce Act), but the Court has repeatedly held that “[r]epeals of
the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly
disfavored, and have been found only in cases of plain repugnancy
between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.”79 The Court has
allowed narrowly crafted exemptions only where “necessary to make
the [subsequent regulatory scheme] work.”80 Even when a federal
agency has determined that a requested transaction was in the public
interest, the Court has often allowed antitrust challenges to that
action.81
77. Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1988). But cf. ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3-9 (1997) (denouncing vigorously common law–type
reasoning as inconsistent with the premises of a representative democracy where most law is
statutory).
78. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 314-27 (1896).
79. United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1962), quoted in Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973) (following the Philadelphia National
Bank holding); see also Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (reiterating that
repeal by implication is not favored).
80. Silver, 373 U.S. at 357; see also United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 422
U.S. 694, 729-30 (1975) (crafting an exemption to permit the SEC regulatory scheme to work).
81. See Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. at 372 (“Activities which come under the jurisdiction
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Finally, the Sherman Act has exercised a gravitational pull on
constitutional law itself. One of the earliest Supreme Court
applications ruled that the Act could not be applied to the sugar trust
because the Commerce Clause authorized congressional regulation of
“commerce” but not intrastate manufacturing.82 The Court’s stingy
opinion was a political sensation and an issue in the 1896 presidential
campaign.83 The post-1896 Court immediately adopted the Commerce
Clause approach of the prior dissenting opinion, which permitted
congressional regulation of intrastate activities which had an “effect”
on interstate commerce.84 In 1906, the Court adopted another
expansive theory of the Commerce Clause when it upheld application
of the Sherman Act to intrastate price fixing that entailed transactions
in the “current of commerce.”85 Although the Sherman Act cases by
no means rescued the Court from two generations of painful struggle
with the Commerce Clause, they were a standing exception to stingy
readings of that congressional power and were also a foundation upon
which the New Deal Court built an expanded version of the
Commerce Clause. Specifically, the “effect on commerce” and
“current of commerce” theories in the Sherman Act cases were
foundational ideas in the New Deal Court’s liberalization of the

of a regulatory agency nevertheless may be subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws.”);
Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 351 (stating that the comptroller’s actions under the Bank
Merger Act are not immune from antitrust laws); Silver, 373 U.S. at 357-61 (holding that selfregulation under the Securities Exchange Act may still be subject to antitrust actions); see also
Calif. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 369 U.S. 482, 487 (1962) (holding that the FPC should not
approve a merger while the validity of the merger is being challenged in federal court on
antitrust grounds); United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 346 (1959) (finding that
FCC action does not preclude antitrust actions). A complex matter is the exception created for
state-sanctioned businesses by Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943) (“We find nothing
in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to
restrain a state . . . from activities directed by its legislature.”). Parker’s current status is unclear;
it was read narrowly in City of LaFayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408-14
(1978), but was preserved in New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439
U.S. 96, 109-11 (1978) (concluding that a regulatory scheme restricting the establishment of car
dealerships fit the Parker state-action exemption).
82. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
83. Gilbert Fite, Election of 1896, in 2 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS,
1789-1968, at 1787, 1793-94 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Fred L. Israel eds., 1971); Allan
Westin, The Supreme Court, the Populist Movement, and the Campaign of 1896, 15 J. POL. 3, 2527 (1953).
84. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 229-31 (1899) (holding that
the Commerce Clause extends even to private contracts that directly affect interstate trade, thus
adopting something like the approach propounded by Justice Harlan’s dissent in E.C. Knight).
85. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1906).
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Commerce Clause to permit expansive federal regulation of the
economy.86
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited or strengthened earlier
measures against race discrimination in voting (Title I), public
accommodations (Title II), public facilities (Title III), public
education (Title IV), programs or activities receiving federal financial
assistance (Title VI), and most workplaces (Title VII).87 Sex
discrimination is also illegal in the workplaces covered by Title VII of
the law.88 As with the Sherman Act, the Civil Rights Act is a proven
super-statute
because
it
embodies
a
great
principle
(antidiscrimination), was adopted after an intense political struggle
and normative debate and has over the years entrenched its norm
into American public life,89 and has pervasively affected federal
statutes and constitutional law. Again, as with the Sherman Act, Title
VII’s principle has been debated, honed, and strengthened through
an ongoing give-and-take among the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches. Unlike the Sherman Act dialectic, the Civil Rights
Act’s evolution has repeatedly been influenced by social movement
ideas and popular pressure on the political process.
Naturally, the statute has been the situs of normative conflict,
some of it still unresolved. (Given its commitment to a great principle
and the requirement of deliberation, it is hard to imagine a superstatute that would not generate intense disagreements as to the
application of the principle to particular cases.) For example, the 1964
statute on its face did not make clear the statute’s application to
employment policies having a disparate racial impact or seeking to
remedy under-representation of minorities. Resolution of those issues
required a refinement of the antidiscrimination principle: Does it
entail actual integration or just equality of opportunity? The agency

86. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (accepting a broad version of
“stream of commerce” theory); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1937)
(accepting a broad version of the “affecting commerce” theory).
87. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 28, and
42 U.S.C.) (1994).
88. Id. § 701(a)-(d), 78 Stat. 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(d) (1994)).
89. Indeed, the normative and political struggle needed to enact the Civil Rights Act was
arguably the greatest and most difficult legislative campaign of the twentieth century. See
generally CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE (1985) (describing the
political struggle).
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charged with enforcing the statute (the EEOC) saw the statute’s
mission as integration.90 The Supreme Court accepted that as the basis
for its early interpretations in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,91 which
established a cause of action for disparate-impact claims, and United
92
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, which permitted some voluntary
affirmative action programs. Scholars were generally supportive of
these interpretations, and the early Rehnquist Court reaffirmed
Weber and extended its reasoning to allow at least some affirmative
action programs benefiting women.93
In 1989, however, the Rehnquist Court bared its strict
constructionist teeth in several employment discrimination cases.94
For the particular Justices on that Court, there was nothing
remarkable about their narrow construction in those cases. Majority
opinions made it harder to prevail in a Griggs lawsuit and set forth
several other narrowing constructions of Title VII. The Court’s
methodology was emblematic of its typical approach to statutory
construction: hew closely to statutory plain meaning without undue
intrusion into common law rights and obligations.95 What the majority
Justices did not appreciate sufficiently was that much of the public did
not consider these ordinary cases. The decisions triggered a public
normative alarm that a bedrock statute was being undermined. Large
majorities in Congress approved the Civil Rights Act of 1991,96 which
90. For excellent overviews from different perspectives, compare HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA, 1964-1971, at 249 (1990) (describing the EEOC’s appeal to the
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to get past the intent requirement of Title VII and shift
toward a disparate-impact model of civil rights), with Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1725 (1991) (reviewing Graham’s work and arguing that the EEOC’s
policy did not represent a shift in focus within the civil rights movement).
91. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
92. 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
93. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 (1987).
94. The main cases were Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989)
(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits discrimination only in the making and enforcement of
contracts, and does not apply to other forms of employment discrimination); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (increasing the plaintiff’s burden of proof); and
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (holding
that the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing
evidence, that an employment decision would have been the same without a focus on gender
when the plaintiff proves that gender was a motivating part of the decision). In Hopkins, the
plaintiff essentially prevailed, and in Wards Cove and Patterson the Court engaged in a delicate
exercise of narrowing established precedents.
95. E.g., Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176 (narrowly construing 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
96. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). For background of the statute and
discussion of the cases overridden, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?:
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reaffirmed Griggs (explicitly)97 and Weber (implicitly).98 This
normative feedback had some effect on the Rehnquist Court even as
its personnel became more conservative.99
Not only has the Court found a new appreciation for the Griggs
precept that Title VII should be construed liberally and aggressively
to achieve its integrative goals,100 but the Court’s newfound liberality
in construing Title VII has also trumped some of its favorite clearstatement rules and (most notably) has generated some strong rules
for regulating sexual harassment in the workplace. In a pair of 1998
decisions, seven-Justice majorities expanded upon the Court’s
decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,101 which had
recognized claims for sexual harassment in the workplace. Although
Title VII nowhere mentions such claims, which originated in feminist
writings in the 1970s and then in EEOC guidelines developed during
the Carter administration,102 they have become a further elaboration
of the antidiscrimination principle contained in Title VII. The two
dissenting Justices complained about the “willful policymaking” by
judges and bureaucrats this entailed.103 The majority responded that
such common law–type rules were needed to carry out the statutory
goal and that such a process had been ratified by Congress in the 1991
Act.104 Although we should expect future Courts (if populated with

Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991).
97. § 3(2)-(3), 105 Stat. at 1071 (including in the purpose of the Act codification of Griggs’s
approach to employment policies having a disparate impact upon minorities); see also id. § 105
(adding a new provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)).
98. Id. § 116 (“Nothing in the amendments made by this title shall be construed to affect
court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance
with the law.”).
99. Thus, liberal Justice Brennan was replaced by moderate-conservative Justice Souter in
1990; liberal Justice Marshall was replaced by conservative Justice Thomas in 1991; moderateliberal Justice Blackmun was replaced by moderate Justice Ginsburg in 1993; and moderateconservative Justice White was replaced by moderate Justice Breyer in 1994. The first two
appointments shifted the balance on the Court far to the right; the latter two had small effects in
general.
100. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (unanimously finding statutory
ambiguity, and relying on the statute’s liberal purpose, to construe § 704, an anti-retaliation rule,
to apply to past as well as present employees).
101. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
102. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1696-1701
(1998).
103. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 772 (1998) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia,
J., dissenting).
104. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 n.4 (1998) (stating, in the
companion case to Ellerth, that “[t]he decision of Congress to leave Meritor intact is
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more conservative Justices) to cavil over the margins of Title VII, we
do not expect such Courts to fuss with the now-expanded core of the
jobs title.
As has the Sherman Act, the Civil Rights Act has pervasively
affected the evolution of public law. Unlike the earlier statute, the
civil rights law explicitly affects other statutory regimes. Title VI
prohibits federally funded programs from discriminating on the basis
of race, ethnicity, or religion.105 Title VII, as amended in 1972,
prohibits state and federal agencies from discriminating in their
personnel policies.106 These provisions contemplate that the
antidiscrimination principle must animate most federal and state
policies. Judges and administrators have internalized the idea well
beyond the explicit commands of the statute. The most expansive
example of the principle in operation is evident in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bob Jones University v. United States.107 Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that “educational”
institutions are entitled to an exemption from federal income
taxation.108 The IRS disallowed Bob Jones University’s exemption,
because its racially discriminatory policies were inconsistent with the
overall “charitable” policy of the exemption.109 Although the statutory
text was broad enough to include schools like Bob Jones and the
exemption was originally adopted during the apartheid era in our
history,110 the Court ruled that current federal policy disallowed the
exemption. Of course, the main evidence of that current policy was
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In particular, the Court emphasized that
Titles IV and VI were evidence of the important public principle that
“racial discrimination in education violates a fundamental public
policy.”111
Just as the Sherman Act provided occasions for the Supreme
Court to get beyond earlier stingy readings of Congress’s Commerce
Clause power, so the public accommodations provisions of the Civil

conspicuous”).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
106. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 717, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16).
107. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
108. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
109. Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 579.
110. Justice Powell maintained that the policy of the exemption is diversity, which might
arguably be subserved by Bob Jones’s ideology. Id. at 609-10 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
111. Id. at 594.
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Rights Act prodded the Court to render its most expansive reading of
the Commerce Clause to date.112 The great normative principle of the
1964 Act pushed the Court to read the Constitution more broadly
than it had done before or has done since. A less-noted chain of
events was in some ways more remarkable. The Supreme Court ruled
that state policies classifying people on the basis of pregnancy do not
necessarily violate the prohibition on sex discrimination because they
divide people into pregnant women and nonpregnant men and
women.113 When the Court extended this idea to Title VII, feminist
groups engaged in a campaign to educate Congress about the many
bars that various kinds of pregnancy-based discrimination posed to
women’s workplace advancement. Congress swiftly overrode the
Court with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.114 The Court
has not only followed the letter of the statutory response but has also
liberally internalized its principle, that pregnancy-based
discrimination is a major engine for disadvantaging women in the
workplace. Hence, the Court has sweepingly applied the PDA to
strike down arguably reasonable pregnancy-based discriminations115
and has refused to invoke the statute against state policies that seek
to remedy employment disadvantages resulting from pregnancy.116
Because the new statutory policy applies to state and federal
agencies, thanks to the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the PDA has
essentially replaced the Equal Protection Clause as the foundational
protection for women against pregnancy-based discrimination.117
112. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964) (holding that Ollie’s Barbecue could
be regulated under the Commerce Clause); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (holding that a motel may be regulated by Congress, even if the
operation of the motel is assumed to be “of a purely local character”). Although United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), called a halt to this expansion of the Commerce Clause, the Court
was careful not to question the authority of the Civil Rights Act precedents. Id. at 558-64.
113. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974).
114. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1994)) (expanding the definition of “sex discrimination” to include pregnancy as a basis for
unlawful discrimination). The statute was meant to override General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976) (citing and following Geduldig). H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750.
115. United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 191 (1991) (invalidating a
rule prohibiting “women capable of bearing children” from working in a hazardous part of an
industrial plant).
116. Cal. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (upholding a
California law requiring employers to give parental leave to mothers but not to fathers).
117. Almost all pregnancy-based discrimination—ranging from job limitations to
employment exclusions or forced leave to insurance and disability protection—is in the
workplace, where Title VII applies. Because its rule is more protective than that of Geduldig,
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Even more dramatic, but also more speculative, evidence of the
Constitution-bending effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 came in
118
Romer v. Evans, where the Supreme Court invalidated a state
constitutional amendment barring state or municipal governments
from recognizing sexual orientation as a basis for “minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.”119 The
Court’s broadly written opinion mainly emphasized the Justices’ fear
that the amendment would deny gay men, lesbians and bisexuals “the
protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary
discrimination in governmental and private settings.”120 The dissent
responded that protection of gay people constituted “special rights,”
which the state could refuse to confer on an unpopular group.121 The
majority saw nothing special about the rights taken away from this
minority group. “These are protections taken for granted by most
people either because they already have them or do not need them;
these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic
life in a free society.”122 The Court cited nothing for this proposition—
nor was citation necessary in light of the way the Civil Rights Act’s
antidiscrimination principle has saturated American social and
political culture.
C. The Endangered Species Act of 1973
As with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 (ESA)123 certainly aspires to super-statute status: it was
developed to foster a great principle and was drafted as expansively

which has not been overruled, plaintiffs rely on Title VII rather than the Equal Protection
Clause. We should not be surprised to see Geduldig bite the constitutional dust someday in light
of its obsolescence after the PDA. Moreover, even though the Supreme Court is now engaged
in a campaign to preclude application of many federal regulatory schemes to the states, under
the Eleventh and perhaps the Tenth Amendment, we think it unlikely that the Court will
invalidate the 1972 amendments extending Title VII to the states.
118. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
119. Id. at 624.
120. Id. at 630.
121. Id. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 631. The Court then invalidated the amendment on the ground that its broad
exclusion of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals was “so discontinuous with the reasons offered for
it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects.” Id.
at 632.
123. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.
(1994)).
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as possible to make that policy one that pervades the economic and
political culture. The ESA rests on the biodiversity principle that it is
in the best interests of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic
variations. In pursuit of that principle, the law authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior to declare species of animal life
“endangered” and creates various protections for species so
designated.124 Section 2 states that the statute provides “a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved” and directs that “all
Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered
species and threatened species.”125 Section 5 authorizes acquisition of
lands needed to preserve endangered species. Pursuant to section 7:
Each Federal agency shall . . . insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat
of such species which is determined by the Secretary . . . to be
126
critical.

Section 9 makes it unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States to “take” an endangered species.127 Compared
with other recently enacted statutes, including the Civil Rights Act,
this is not an elaborately detailed statutory scheme—but it has proven
to be a far-reaching one in a relatively short period of time.
The key to the ESA’s aspiration, as with the Sherman and Civil
Rights Acts, is that it consciously embodies a great principle:
biodiversity. If we are to take seriously our humane and religious
responsibilities as custodians of the earth and its life populations, this
is an enduring principle of enormous consequence. That idea has not
been lost on the officials charged with enforcing and construing the
124. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a)-(c) (authorizing the Secretary of Interior to designate endangered
species and habitats “critical” to their survival); id. § 1533(d) (authorizing the Secretary to issue
regulations); id. § 1533(f) (requiring the Secretary to develop and implement “recovery plans”
for such species); id. § 1534 (authorizing federal land acquisition to conserve endangered
species); id. § 1538 (prohibiting actions jeopardizing the welfare of an endangered species); id.
§ 1540 (providing penalties for violations of the preceding statutes).
125. Id. § 1531(b)-(c); see also id. § 1532(3) (defining “conserve” as meaning “to use and the
use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided [by this statute] are no longer
necessary”).
126. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
127. Id. § 1538(a)(1); see also id. § 1532(19) (defining “take” to mean “harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct”).
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law—including the Rehnquist Court. That Court’s most elegant
internal debate in a statutory case is Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
128
of Communities for a Great Oregon. The issue was whether a
private farmer’s destruction of the habitat of an endangered species
could be a taking in violation of section 9.129 As most first-year law
students learn, the common law understanding of “take” entails
actual harm or control of a particular animal,130 and the statute’s
structure lent considerable support to this common law view. Such
arguments usually prevail in Rehnquist Court statutory cases, but not
in Sweet Home, where they attracted only three votes.131 The majority
of the Court interpreted the anti-taking provision liberally to carry
out its fundamental biodiversity-promoting purpose.132
The breadth of the ESA as applied is even more striking in its
effect on other federal laws. If there was any doubt that the statute’s
bar to federal programs that harmed endangered species and their
habitats needed to be taken seriously, it was laid to rest in the famous
case of TVA v. Hill.133 In the greatest statutory opinion of his career,
Chief Justice Burger ruled that the ESA barred completion of a $120
million dam because its completion would destroy the habitat of the
endangered snail darter.134 The Chief Justice’s opinion is best-known
as an exemplar of the plain meaning rule and a separation of powers
rationale for such a rule,135 but it also stands for the proposition that
courts ought to apply statutes to carry out their purposes. Indeed,
what is most excellent about the Chief’s opinion is its synthesis of the
two ideas: “The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was
to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act but

128. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
129. Id. at 690.
130. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding that rights to and
possession of a wild animal required killing or controlling, and not merely pursuing the animal).
131. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas).
132. Id. at 699. The majority was not without good arguments drawn from the language and
structure of the ESA, but on the whole those arguments made by the dissenters were better.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 249-71
(2000) (analyzing the various arguments extensively).
133. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
134. Id. at 172-73.
135. Charles F. Lettow, Looking at Federal Administrative Law with a Constitutional
Framework in Mind, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 5, 9 (1992).
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also in literally every section of the statute.”136 Thus, the Court
insisted upon observance of the ESA’s directive, which trumped not
only the government’s cost-benefit analysis but also appropriations
laws adopted in and after 1973 that had continued to fund the dam in
question, notwithstanding legislative notice that the completed dam
would endanger the snail darter.137
There are limits to the ESA’s great principle, however, and these
limits threaten the law’s success and future as a super-statute. An
initial and wholly unsurprising limit is that in particular cases our
political culture is not willing to protect great principles at any price.
Thus, Congress responded to Hill with an administrative mechanism
for providing variances from the strict requirements of section 7.138
Congress responded to the agency habitat regulation at issue in Sweet
Home by creating an administrative mechanism by which private
landowners could apply for variances from the strict requirements of
section 9.139 (Both Supreme Court decisions generated vigorous
dissenting opinions whose concerns were ameliorated, in part, by the
legislation.) A more fundamental limit is the persistent questioning
about the statute’s effectiveness relative to its substantial costs.
According to the law’s critics, after almost a generation of statutory
operation, some species have become extinct, and very few have been
removed from the endangered list (and those that have graduated are
said to owe little if any of their success to the ESA).140 Although the
ESA’s principle of biodiversity has stuck in the public culture, its
mechanism for effectuating the principle—prohibitions against
private-party and government-program harm rather than more
proactive government programs—remains debatable.
136. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184.
137. Id. at 189-93. Hill is the leading case for the proposition that federal courts will presume
that appropriations measures do not make substantive changes in the law. See id. at 190.
138. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3751,
3752-60 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994)); see also Energy and Water
Development Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69, tit. IV, 93 Stat. 437, 449 (exempting
specifically the dam at issue in Hill); Robertson v. Seattle Audobon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 431-41
(1992) (following a statutory provision that clearly overrode the ESA as to specified forest land
that had been protected as habitat for the endangered spotted owl).
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1).
140. E.g., Timothy Beatley, Preserving Biodiversity, 66 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 5, 7 (2000)
(observing that only eleven species “have recovered sufficiently to be removed from the
[endangered species] list”); David S. Wilcove, The Promise and the Disappointment of the
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 275, 277 (1998) (noting, as evidence of the “low
success rate” of the ESA, that only “nine percent of our endangered species are improving in
status”).
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Moreover, and perhaps relatedly, it remains to be seen how
strongly the ESA will affect the contours of constitutional law, as the
Sherman Act and the Civil Rights Act have done. In recent years, the
Rehnquist Court has undermined the ESA in an interesting
procedural way: the Court’s opinions have limited the ability of bioconservationists to bring suit to challenge underenforcement of the
ESA,141 while expansively construing the statute to allow virtually any
aggrieved landowner to bring suit challenging overenforcement of the
statute.142 A cautionary concurring opinion in the former case suggests
that litigation may have been sui generis,143 in which event concerns
about the Court’s procedural asymmetry would be greatly abated.
III. ELABORATION AND RAMIFICATIONS
OF THE SUPER-STATUTE IDEA
Our idea that a subcategory of statutes is special not only adds a
new dimension to this country’s statutory history but also helps
explain most of the paradoxically liberal and purposive decisions by
the conservative and textualist Rehnquist Court. If we are right that
at least some laws are super-statutes, what implications should that
insight have for legal doctrine and theory? It should be no surprise
that we think there are many implications. In the process of exploring
the implications, we shall also say more about the epistemology of
super-statutes: how they come into being, how to recognize them, and
how they interact.
A. General Theory and Doctrines of Statutory Interpretation
Our theory provides a principled and useful way to draw the
vexing line between strict and liberal construction. The oldest

141. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557-67, 571-78 (1992) (holding that
plaintiffs concerned with species preservation and who had in the past visited sites of
endangered species had no standing to sue the Secretary for his opinion that the ESA has no
application to federally funded projects outside the United States).
142. E.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 157-79 (1997) (allowing landowners objecting to
species-preservation measures to bring suit pursuant to the ESA’s citizen-suit provision and
finding injury-in-fact through reasonable speculation).
143. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that Congress clearly
has the authority to identify nontraditional injuries and extend chains of causation to satisfy
Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement but must do so in the statute, which did not help the
instant plaintiffs). Interestingly, Justice O’Connor, the Court’s most articulate stickler for
standing requirements, joined two other Justices in dissent on the standing point. Id. at 589
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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chestnuts in statutory interpretation doctrine have been that “statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed,” but
“remedial statutes should be liberally construed.” What remedial
statute is not also in derogation of the common law? A drawback of
Warren Court–style activism is that too many statutes are construed
liberally; the converse drawback of Rehnquist Court–style textualism
is that too many statutes are construed too literally. The theory of
super-statutes suggests this typology:
•

Super-statutes should be construed liberally and in a common
law way, but in light of the statutory purpose and principle as
well as compromises suggested by statutory texts.

•

Ordinary statutes should be construed with greater focus on the
statutory text, but with attention to statutory purpose and
legislative history when the statutory terms are ambiguous.

•

Penal statutes should be applied strictly, reading statutory text
no more broadly than the prototypical, core signification of its
terms permit.

The liberal approach to super-statutes is of course suggested by
the Court’s decisions interpreting the Sherman Act, Title VII, and the
ESA, but it is particularly well-illustrated by the two sexual
harassment cases decided in 1998. In Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
144
Ellerth, the issue was what responsibility an employer has under
Title VII for a supervisor’s unwelcome sexual advances and threats of
retaliation.145 If Title VII were a criminal statute, the employer would
not be liable for such advances absent a more specific scienter
showing. If Title VII were an ordinary statute, it is not clear that
courts should fashion detailed rules for figuring out when supervisor
advances (unknown to the employer) constitute “discrimination . . .
because of . . . sex.” It would be well within our legal process tradition
for the Court to insist that any such rules be fashioned by Congress. It
is notable that no Justice in Ellerth took this position; all nine
Justices—none of whom is an open activist—were willing to fashion
specific rules, common law–style, to guide the agency, courts, and
attorneys in determining when the employer should be liable.146 The
144. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
145. Id. at 746-47.
146. Id. at 755-66 (deriving detailed standards from the common law of agency and adapting
them to Title VII’s goals); id. at 767-71 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (advancing a simpler negligence
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debate within the Court was entirely about what detailed set of rules
the judiciary should read into the open-textured statutory text. Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court came up with some moderately
tough rules: when the harassing supervisor visits a tangible
employment action on the employee, both the policy of Title VII and
principles of agency render the employer vicariously liable; when
there is no tangible employment consequence, Title VII policies
suggest there should sometimes be liability for the employer, subject
to a defense that the employer took due care to prevent harassment
(such as through an anti-harassment policy and complaint procedure)
and the employee failed to take advantage of the employer’s internal
protections.147
Although the rules developed by Justice Kennedy are not the
most liberal, pro-plaintiff rules the Court could have derived,
choosing such rules is not required under our theory. Conservative
judges and commentators are certainly correct to point out that no
principle must be pursued at any cost and even the most important
public policy runs up against others that set limits on it.148 These kinds
of trade-offs and judgments have been the life of the common law.
Thus, our super-statute rule of construction requires that interpreters
develop the statute, common law–style, to carry out its robust
principle and purposes, but remain cognizant of cross-cutting costs
and countervailing policies. Ellerth is a classic case for this kind of
reasoning.
B. Canons of Statutory Construction
Judges and lawyers throughout American history have
appreciated the importance of the canons of statutory construction.149
Influenced or perhaps corrupted by Karl Llewellyn’s list showing
every canon to have a counter-canon negating it,150 lawyers today are
more reluctant to believe that the canons “determine” (ex ante)

standard, but also in a common law–style).
147. Id. at 764-66.
148. E.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989)
(conceding that his originalist theory would not allow barbaric punishments, for example, even
if allowed by original intent circa 1791).
149. For a handy introduction, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY &
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY ch. 7 (3d ed. forthcoming 2001).
150. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
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rather than “justify” (ex post) judicial decisions in the hard cases. The
canons may nevertheless form an interpretive regime that at least
puts the legislature and others on notice as to the rules of thumb
judges will follow in applying statutes.151 Our theory of super-statutes
provides some ground rules for applying the artillery of canons.
Consider how our theory illuminates some of the important textual,
extrinsic-source (or deference), and even substantive canons.
1. Textual Canons. Among the most fundamental canons of
statutory construction are the ordinary-meaning rule and its
corollaries. The rule is that statutory terms are to be applied in the
way an ordinary speaker of the English language would understand
them. The theory of super-statutes suggests that even this simple rule
must be understood in a more complicated way:
•

For penal statutes, which are to be construed strictly, interpreters
should not extend words beyond their prototypical, or core,
152
meanings.

•

For ordinary statutes, which are to be construed in a regular way,
interpreters should apply words in the normal range used by
ordinary speakers of the language.

•

For super-statutes, which are to be construed liberally and
purposively, interpreters should apply words broadly and
evolutively, the way the courts have applied terms like “restraint
of trade” (Sherman Act), “discriminate” (Civil Rights Act), and
“take” (ESA).

If you want to think about super-statutes as “common law
statutes,” as suggested by Scalia’s antitrust opinion quoted above,153
then the ordinary-meaning rule swiftly loses most of its force, as
interpreters (like Scalia) are soon enough construing the precedents
more than the text, and applying the statutory principle to new fact

151. ESKRIDGE, supra note 43, at 275 (“The canons . . . combine predictability and
legitimacy in statutory interpretation: by applying the relevant canon(s), the lawyer can figure
out what the legislature intended a statute to mean, which in turn is a sure prediction of how a
judge will interpret it.”).
152. For an elaboration of the idea of applying “prototypical” word meanings in criminal
cases, see Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory
Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235, 270-78.
153. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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situations through the reasoning-by-analogy process characterized by
the common law.
The operation of some of the famous textual canons of deduction
from text also illustrates how they need to be applied differently to
super-statutes. One popular canon is inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius: the inclusion of one thing in a list suggests the exclusion of all
others.154 Law professors consider this canon unreliable or even bogus.
Consider this thought experiment. Mother tells Sarah, “You may not
kick or pinch your sister Marissa.” Thinking inclusio unius, Sarah hits
her little sister. That is an abuse of both logic and the sister, for the
normative baseline against which Mother was speaking was the
principle, “do not harm sister.” On the other hand, if Mother had told
Sarah, “You may have one scoop of ice cream and one cookie,”
inclusio unius properly suggests to Sarah that she is not authorized to
eat a candy bar. The baseline is, “only a few teeth-destroying nonnutritious snacks for children.” This thought experiment suggests
that, for super-statutes, inclusio unius applies only when the new item
on a list would derogate from the principle or policy that is the
baseline for that statute.
The Burger Court invoked this idea to apply Title VII to law firm
partnerships in Hishon v. King & Spalding.155 Because partnerships
were not included in the statutorily enumerated exemptions from
coverage, the Court properly reasoned that partnerships were not
exempt from Title VII. “When Congress wanted to grant an employer
complete immunity, it expressly did so.”156 This was a valid inference
only because the statutory principle (antidiscrimination) seems just as
applicable to law firm partnerships as to other forms of business
organization. Contrariwise, inclusio unius in Weber operated to trim
back statutory coverage.157 Section 703(j) says that Title VII should
not be applied to “require” employers to grant preferences based on
race or sex.158 The Court reasoned from this prohibition that the
statute could be applied to “permit” such preferences: because
Congress had prohibited only mandatory preferences, it had not
prohibited voluntary ones.159 This is a plausible use of the canon—but

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1635 (7th ed. 1999).
467 U.S. 69, 77-78 (1984).
Id.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-04 (1979).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994).
Weber, 443 U.S. at 202-04.
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only if one assumes (as the Court did) that the baseline norm of Title
VII is to redress historic racial segregation in the workplace and the
exclusion of people of color from desirable jobs.
Other canons of construction should be understood the same
way. For example, the canon noscitur a sociis (a thing is known by its
associates) ought not be applied without consideration of statutory
goals and purposes, as well as other legal values. Thus, the Court was
correct in Sweet Home to read the statutory term “harm” in light of
the strong purpose of the ESA to protect endangered species against
indirect as well as direct threats.160 Justice Scalia’s effort in dissent to
invoke noscitur a sociis was potentially persuasive because “harm”
was part of a list that included direct rather than indirect threats
(“pursue,” “shoot,” “capture,” etc.)—but only if Congress had
adopted the norm of state noninterference with private property use
that did not directly threaten endangered species.161 Because Congress
in the ESA was decidedly changing common-law baselines, the Court
majority had the better argument.
2. Deference Canons. Some of the canons of construction say
that a judge should adopt interpretation “X” out of deference to a
prior construction of the provision to mean “X.” Thus, a court might
apply the ESA to bar private owners from affecting the habitat of an
endangered species because (a) a prior court has so construed the
ESA (as the Sweet Home Court did), or (b) an agency charged with
implementing the ESA has done so (as the Department of Interior
had done before Sweet Home), or (c) a committee or legislator who
drafted and managed the ESA through Congress took that view (a
perspective pressed by Justice Scalia’s dissent in Sweet Home). The
theory of super-statutes suggests some variations on the conventional
wisdom for two of these three deference canons.
In part because Congress is deemed the most appropriate forum
for correction, most statutory precedents are entitled to a superstrong presumption of correctness, exceeding even that which stare
decisis normally accords common law precedents. We have been
critical of that super-strong presumption for ordinary statutes because
there are many barriers (including inertia) to Congress’s correction of
ordinary precedents.162 The traditional rule will sometimes be
160. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter Comtys. for a Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 697-98 (1995).
161. Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. Eskridge, supra note 69, at 1385-1409.
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appropriate for super-statutes, however, because Supreme Court
constructions are likely to attract the attention of Congress and to be
overridden if they misread the statute in light of its principle—as the
Court did in the pregnancy discrimination cases of the mid-1970s
(immediate and decisive override) and the Title VII cases of the late
1980s (immediate and angry override), but not in the sexual
harassment cases of the late 1990s (Congress kept quiet). Where a
statutory precedent has stimulated focused normative attention in the
political process—and survived it intact—stare decisis values are and
ought to be heightened.
The deference-to-agency canon is completely applicable to
super-statutes but with some twists. The development of a superstatute and its principle is often going to be accomplished most
productively at the agency level, and so deference is appropriate, as it
was in Griggs, Weber, Faragher and Ellerth, and Sweet Home. The
limit to deference, when the agency’s position is at odds with the law,
applies to super-statutes as well. Also, deference is not appropriate
for agency litigating positions, such as the Department of Justice’s
positions in Sherman Act prosecutions. One twist arises out of the
fact that super-statutory principles become part of the fundamental
law—which the judiciary is uniquely charged with developing and
applying. Thus, the EEOC’s views, intelligent and well-formed as
they may be, have not been a great situs for deference, because the
Supreme Court is just as involved in articulating and deliberating
about the antidiscrimination principle as the agency officials are.
Another twist is that super-statutes are constantly at risk of rentseeking exceptions and loopholes. Agencies are supposed to guard
against this but are themselves susceptible to interest-group capture
on at least some issues. To the extent that courts are less susceptible
to such capture, they stand as an important monitor of agency
weakness in this regard.
The committee-report and sponsor-statement canons have been
under siege for half a generation. Although these canons have
survived as a basis for construing and for limiting ordinary statutes,
they are inappropriate for construing and especially for limiting
super-statutes. Because they evolve, common law–style, superstatutes ought not be tied to the original expectations of their drafters
to the degree that ordinary and penal statutes are. Just as the
Sherman Act’s “restraint of trade” language has not tied interpreters
to nineteenth-century common law precedents, so the speeches of
Senator Sherman or other supporters have little to teach us about the
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statute today. Hence, it was ironic to see Justice Scalia, dissenting in
Sweet Home, invoke sponsor statements as the only support for his
central proposition that the ESA’s government-purchase provision—
and not its anti-take provision—was the only mechanism by which
habitats on private land would be protected.163 Apart from his own
critique of relying on isolated snippets of legislative chit-chat, Justice
Scalia’s deployment of legislative history was even more inapt
because whatever original understandings the drafters had for the
ESA were overtaken by the statute’s evolving implementation by the
Department of Interior, the Supreme Court’s broad construction of it
in TVA v. Hill164 (itself contrary to the expectations of the 1973
Congress), Congress’s amendment of the law in 1982 to create an
administrative mechanism for private landowners to sacrifice some
habitat for legitimate land use, and so forth. Justice Scalia and his law
clerks should be gently chided for smuggling in legislative history
under these circumstances.165
3. Substantive Canons. There are more substantive canons of
statutory construction than you can shake a stick at; many of them
reflect constitutional values (more on that in the next section).166 We
do not dispute that those canons apply and ought to apply to superstatutes. Our theory would caution, however, that the substantive
canons must be applied with due consideration of the statutory
purposes and principle, and super-statutes ought not always bow to
the canons. One of the Rehnquist Court’s favorite canons is the rule
against
extraterritorial
application
of
federal
statutes.
Notwithstanding this rule, courts have long applied the Sherman Act
to cover activities outside the United States, with a variety of limiting
principles.167 We strongly support this relaxation of the rule, because

163. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. 437 U.S. 153 (1976).
165. Justice Scalia gets only a little slack for his stated reason: Justice Stevens, for the Court,
was relying on legislative history, so this was just defensive stuff! Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 728
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority was deploying such history only as evidence of statutory
purpose, which Scalia ridiculed but did not deny, and not for any particular proposition. In other
cases, Justice Scalia has refused to join any mention of legislative history. E.g., Assoc. Commer.
Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 963 (1997) (refusing to join a footnote of the opinion in which
legislative history is discussed).
166. For a list, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 53, at 97 (listing canons followed by the
Rehnquist Court).
167. E.g., Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962) (“A
conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States is
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anticompetitive activities are necessarily going to occur outside the
United States in many cases and the statutory purpose would be
needlessly sacrificed by a strict limit to U.S. activities.
On the other hand, the rule is more logically applied to the ESA,
as Justice Stevens has suggested.168 Section 7 of the statute, construed
in TVA v. Hill,169 directs federal agencies to ensure that actions
funded by them do not result in the destruction of the habitats of
endangered species. The statute is written broadly enough to include
overseas projects funded in part by foreign aid, and the biodiversity
goal of the statute would be subserved by extraterritorial application
of the law.170 Counting against such application is the argument that
such an interpretation would pervasively affect U.S. foreign relations
in hard-to-predict ways. Because foreign relations are wholly reserved
for Congress and the President, the ESA should not be hastily applied
to overseas projects.
On yet another hand, the Court was wrong when it applied the
canon in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco).171 The issue
in that case was whether Title VII applied to an American company
discriminating against an American employee in an office located
overseas.172 The statutory language was broad enough to include such
cases, and some of the provisions seemed to assume that firms could
be liable for overseas discrimination.173 The EEOC read the law this
way. The broad statutory purpose would support such a reading—yet
the Court read Title VII more narrowly. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
majority opinion refused to defer to the agency or to follow the
statutory purpose and demanded a clearer statement on the face of
not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained of occurs
in foreign countries.”); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927) (holding
that a conspiracy to restrain trade involving the importation of foreign goods that would
increase prices in the United States falls within federal jurisdiction); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243
U.S. 66, 88 (1917) (finding federal jurisdiction in an instance where defendants’ actions
“affected the foreign commerce of this country and [were] put into operation here”). But see
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909) (holding that anticompetitive
practices undertaken entirely outside the United States are not subject to the Sherman Act when
the acts are permissible under local law).
168. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 585-89 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(maintaining that the statute’s inclusive language is not sufficient by itself to overcome a
presumption of extraterritorial application of the law).
169. 437 U.S. 153 (1998).
170. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
171. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
172. Id. at 248.
173. Id. at 266 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the statute that it would apply extraterritorially.174 This was a
wrongheaded application of the canon. The decision might be
defended on the ground that the Court was reluctant to craft rules for
when Title VII should and should not be applied for discrimination
outside the United States—but federal courts have done precisely
that in antitrust law,175 and the facts of Aramco were so easy that the
Court could have started with the narrowest possible rule: an
American company discriminating against an American employee in
its foreign office can be sued under Title VII.
The 1991 Civil Rights Act overrode Aramco and generally
reaffirmed the antidiscrimination norm for employment. Has the 1991
Act’s dramatic reaffirmation had an effect on the Rehnquist Court’s
willingness to apply Title VII’s principle more expansively? Consider
176
West v. Gibson. Another of the Rehnquist Court’s favorite canons is
its super-strong rule against waivers of federal sovereign immunity.177
The 1972 amendments to Title VII authorized the EEOC to enforce
the antidiscrimination rule against federal and state agencies
“through appropriate remedies.”178 The issue in West was whether
that general provision authorized the EEOC to assess compensatory
damages against the federal government for discrimination.179 Justice
Kennedy’s opinion treated this as a routine case for application of this
favored canon: the super-strong presumption requires more targeted
statutory language than “appropriate remedies,” and so U.S.
sovereign immunity was not affected.180 Moreover, in 1972, Title VII
did not authorize compensatory damages, and so the original meaning
of “appropriate remedies” did not include damages; that meaning was
strongly reinforced by the canon noscitur a sociis, because all the
remedies specifically mentioned in the 1972 amendments were

174. Id. at 258.
175. E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (holding that “the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce
some substantial effect in the United States”).
176. 527 U.S. 212 (1999).
177. E.g., Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999) (“We have
frequently held . . . that a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its
scope, in favor of the sovereign.”); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992)
(referring to “the traditional principle that the Government’s consent to be sued must be
construed strictly in favor of the sovereign”) (citations omitted).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (1994).
179. West, 527 U.S. 212.
180. Id. at 224-25 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy’s dissent was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
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equitable.181 Concededly, the 1991 Act authorized compensatory
damages—but only in court cases. Invoking the canon of negative
implication, Kennedy contrasted the new § 1981a(a)(1), which
constituted a specific waiver of sovereign immunity in civil actions
brought against the United States in court cases.182 So if Congress had
wanted the EEOC to assess such damages, it could have used the
same directed language.183 This is the Rehnquist Court’s normal
deployment of this super-strong canon and some of the textual
canons—but it was in dissent!
Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court in West followed an
interpretive approach more appropriate for a super-statute. First, he
refused to read the 1972 language in a static way. “Words in statutes
can enlarge or contract their scope as other changes, in law or in the
world, require their application to new instances or make old
applications anachronistic.”184 Thus, “appropriate remedies” meant
something different after 1991. Second, this structural and liberal
reading of the statute is consistent with its strong antidiscrimination
purpose. “To deny that an EEOC compensatory damages award is,
statutorily speaking, ‘appropriate’ would undermine this remedial
scheme.”185 Finally, Justice Breyer disposed, at the end of his opinion,
of the super-strong canon. Notably, he refused to require magic words
on the part of Congress and found sufficient evidence of waiver from
the statutory scheme as it has evolved, the purpose of the law, and
common sense.186 In its attention to the statutory purpose and
principle as well as its text and structure, Justice Breyer’s opinion is
exemplary of how courts ought to interpret super-statutes, especially
when they are confronted with substantive canons.
C. Super-Statutes in Collision
The most dramatic examples of the complexity of our approach
are cases where a super-statute hits up against another statutory
scheme. We have already seen how super-statutes frequently trump
181. Id. at 225-26 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 226-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 218.
185. Id. Justice Breyer also invoked the legislative history of the 1991 Amendment. Id. at
219-21. Although we do not consider this necessary, either generally or in this case, it was
“appropriate” because the amendments were so recent and the history instructive as to the way
the 1972 and 1991 provisions fit together.
186. Id. at 222.
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or modify other statutory schemes, but sometimes it is a super-statute
that gives way. Consider FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
187
Corp. The case involved the FDA’s finding that nicotine is a “drug”
within the meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
(FDCA).188 At first blush, this case would appear easy: the FDCA
allows the agency to regulate “articles (other than food) intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body”;189 the Court has
ruled that this statute is to be given “a liberal construction consistent
with [its] overriding purpose to protect the public health”;190 the FDA
found that nicotine affects the body through addiction and (based on
more recent evidence) that cigarette manufacturers intended their
product to have that effect. Surely the FDA has jurisdiction under the
super-statute. Yet a narrowly divided Supreme Court said that it does
not. The Court first invoked internal statutory inconsistencies that
FDA jurisdiction over tobacco would produce,191 but more
persuasively relied on decades of congressional deliberation about
cigarette regulation. During those deliberations, the FDA repeatedly
took the position before congressional committees that it did not have
regulatory authority over tobacco products, and Congress repeatedly
adopted legislation regulating such products through education rather
than through prohibitory rules.192 Dissenting Justices disputed that
Congress had relied on the FDA’s statements and argued that such
statements were made before the FDA had good evidence of the
tobacco companies’ “intent” that smokers should become addicted to
nicotine so they would be assured of a captive market.193
The FDA tobacco case can be evaluated in a number of ways
from the perspective of our theory. For starters, the theory lends
much support to the dissenting Justices, if the FDCA is a superstatute. But is it? The FDCA, the successor to the Pure Food &
Drugs Act of 1906, embodies a great policy—protection of the public
from substances harmful to human life—that has stuck in our political

187. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
188. 75 Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301
(1994)). This is the successor statute to the Pure Food & Drugs Act of 1906. Pub. L. No. 384, 34
Stat. 768.
189. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994).
190. United States v. Article of Drug Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969).
191. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132-43. But see id. at 163-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(disputing any internal statutory inconsistencies).
192. Id. at 143-57.
193. Id. at 186-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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culture. Thinkers from virtually all perspectives would agree about
that policy. The FDCA also easily meets the procedural test for
super-statutes. The 1906 Act grew out of public outrage against
unsanitary food processing,194 and the 1937 Act reflected both
intellectual and political feedback to prior regulation and expanded
the FDA’s jurisdiction further. Even critics of the law and of the FDA
would agree that it has headed off many health disasters and has
operated intelligently. One might disagree as to the FDCA’s
application to a drug (nicotine) that people choose to take because it
gives them pleasure, but the process by which the FDA reached its
conclusions was a deliberative and substantively thoughtful one.
In light of these criteria, we conclude that the FDCA is an
important, robust law—a super-statute—whose broad protection of
public safety ought not be sacrificed casually. This was the foundation
for Justice Breyer’s argument in the FDA tobacco case: after a long
deliberative process, the FDA has found that tobacco products are
highly dangerous and imperil public health in many ways; given the
process and the unquestioned correctness of the FDA’s conclusion,
the statute would have to be dead against the agency for the Court to
block its action.195 Doubts should be resolved in favor of the agency’s
jurisdiction over this dangerous drug. On the whole, we find this a
persuasive approach. The Court majority did not, however. Its
argument that FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products is inconsistent
with the FDCA’s general statutory scheme is not persuasive—but
that was probably not dispositive for the Court either.
One might read the Court’s opinion for the proposition that even
super-statutes must give way to detailed regulatory regimes
intentionally adopted by Congress to be substitutes for the earthshaking move of banning tobacco products or even regulating them
heavily.196 This move is, for better or for worse, consistent with superstatute theory. “In our anxiety to effectuate the congressional
194. JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SEARCHING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUG
ACT OF 1906, at 292-93 (1989). But see GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A
REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 98-106 (1963) (offering a more
skeptical view of the origins of the pure food and drug law).
195. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 189-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. This appears to have been the view of Justice O’Connor, author of the opinion for the
Court. Id. at 143-57 (noting that, starting in 1965, Congress repeatedly adopted mild,
educational statutes rather than prohibitory ones, with full knowledge that the FDA did not
believe tobacco fell within its jurisdiction); see also id. at 157-60 (explaining that, given the
“unique place” tobacco has in American cultural and economic history, the decision to ban or
seriously regulate it must be made by Congress).
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purpose of protecting the public, we must take care not to extend the
scope of the statute beyond the point where Congress indicated it
would stop,” said Justice O’Connor for the Court.197 Substantively,
Justice O’Connor expressed no view that disclosure laws are an
effective way for the government to regulate deadly tobacco products,
and there is no reason to think that she or her colleagues found that
idea persuasive. Procedurally, however, she was impressed that
Congress had deliberated on the issue for decades, that the FDA
repeatedly reassured Congress that tobacco products did not fall
within its jurisdiction, and that Congress, in her view, relied on those
representations in crafting the milder statutory scheme.198 One might
be critical of the statutory scheme as a derogation from the FDCA’s
great purpose, but even skeptics such as ourselves find Justice
O’Connor’s detailed history of congressional tobacco regulation an
excellent brief for overriding the agency. Both the rule of law and
democratic values require super-statutes to give way to congressional
judgments derogating from their principles.
Although not suggested by either opinion in the case, a further
possible argument for the majority position in Brown & Williamson is
that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965
(FCLAA)199 is itself a super-statute. It bears at least some of the
indicia, for it embodies a robust principle, that consumers should
know the health risks of tobacco products and the government ought
to compel the producers (among others) to inform them; its policy has
been the basis for subsequent federal and some state laws. The Court
has applied its balanced policy to preempt some state tort rules that
could impose damages liability onto tobacco companies.200 In that
event, the FDCA and the FCLAA would be clashing super-statutes,
and one would have to give—presumably the former in light of the
FDA’s longtime representations that it did not have jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products and the fact that FDA regulation of

197. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161 (quoting United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394
U.S. 784, 800 (1969) (quoting 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951))). But
see id. at 182-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the many tobacco-disclosure statutes are
consistent with the agency’s unwillingness to act until it was sure the tobacco companies met the
intent requirement of the FDCA).
198. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 145-46, 155-56.
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994).
200. Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1992) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion) (finding that, notwithstanding the traditional presumption that federal statutes do not
preempt state tort law, some tort remedies are preempted by the FCLAA).
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nicotine would render the FCLAA obsolete or even irrelevant
virtually overnight.
This would be a tidy application of our theory, for in a nation
brimming with super-statutes one would expect them to come into
conflict frequently. Nevertheless, we resist that characterization as to
the FCLAA. As we said, no Justice on the Court characterized the
FCLAA in such glowing terms; nor do we. The statute is best treated
as ordinary legislation, and perhaps not even that, as its regulatory
regime emerges in retrospect as a cowardly one: in the face of
mounting evidence that cigarette smoking is potentially lethal,
Congress bowed to tobacco interests in requiring only the mildest
form of regulation.
In any event, there are plenty of other examples of genuine
super-statutes in conflict.201 The Supreme Court has generally
resolved those clashes through a rough comparative impairment
approach: the Court will trim back the super-statute whose policy and
principle would be relatively less impaired by nonapplication. Thus, if
applying super-statute A to a case would centrally undermine the
policy or principle of super-statute B, a court ought to and will
decline to apply A if its policy or principle is not so centrally
implicated.
For an example, consider the interaction between the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1926202and various super-statutory schemes.
The FAA “reverse[d] the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements” and “place[d] arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts.”203 The statute not only abrogated the
common law hostility to arbitration clauses but also established a
procedural structure of rules for giving such clauses bite; it has been a
super-statute and is now part of the fabric of the law. Thus, the
Supreme Court has construed the FAA broadly, with a breadth
sweeping well beyond the statute’s plain meaning and the probable
expectations of its framers in 1925. For example, the Court in

201. E.g., Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 506-07 (1986)
(noting the appearance of a clash between the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 and the CERCLA);
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545-51 (1974) (discussing the potential clash between Title VII
and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934).
202. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
203. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citing Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 & n.6 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 510 n.4 (1974)); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995)
(invoking the same history).
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204
Southland v. Keating ruled that the FAA not only required
arbitration in federal courts but also preempted state anti-arbitration
laws to require enforcement of such remedies in state courts as well.
This was a broad reading of the statute, probably beyond the
contemplation of the Congress that adopted it.205 The broad
application represents an invasion of state autonomy unusual for a
Supreme Court as supportive of federalism as the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have been.
The hard FAA cases in recent years have been those where
plaintiffs suing under federal securities, antitrust, or consumerprotection laws have confronted defenses grounded upon arbitration
clauses in adhesive contracts. Plaintiffs in those cases have maintained
that the FAA policy must give way to those of other super-statutes.
Some of the cases were easy for the Court. In Alexander v. Gardner206
Denver Co., the Court ruled that arbitration did not bar an
employee from bringing his Title VII claims to federal court. The
Court found that the arbitral process, emphasizing local trade
customs and business practices, was peculiarly inappropriate for
evaluating antidiscrimination claims.207 The policy of the FAA was not
severely compromised by this exemption, because the FAA’s core
policy is arbitration of commercial and contractual disputes, and the
policy of Title VII was thought to be jeopardized by preclusive effect
of arbitrations. Generally, before 1985, the Supreme Court declined
to apply the FAA to cases where colorable rights were pressed
pursuant to federal super-statutes.208

204. 465 U.S. 1, 31 (1984). The Supreme Court considered and refused to overrule
Southland in Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273. More recently, the Court has observed that Congress
has not moved to amend the FAA in response to Southland or Allied-Bruce. Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 1312-13 (2001).
205. For careful examinations of the history of the 1925 Act that demonstrate the more
limited aspirations of the framers of the statute, see Circuit City, 121 S. Ct. at 1314-16 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); id. at 1318-22 (Souter, J., dissenting); Southland, 465 U.S. 19-21 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
206. 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (“[T]he federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes
and the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated
by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration
clause . . . and his cause of action under Title VII.”).
207. Id. at 56-57 (stating that the unique role of the arbitrator and the incomplete factfinding process of arbitration make it an “appropriate forum for the final resolution of rights
created by Title VII”).
208. E.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (“[A]lthough
arbitration is well suited to resolving contractual disputes . . . it cannot provide an adequate
substitution for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights
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A turning point came in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
209
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. where the parties had agreed to send
antitrust claims to an international arbitral tribunal. The plain
meaning of the FAA and the original legislative intent were
unsupportive of an application of that statute to statutory claims
generally.210 Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court refused to limit
the statute in this way, however, and presumed that it should be
applied to carry out its expansive purpose.211 The hard issue was
whether there was a conflict between the FAA and the Sherman Act.
The dissenting Justices thought that international arbitration would
derogate from the deterrent force of the law’s treble damages
remedy; under that premise, the FAA should probably not have
applied, because it would have been too strong a sacrifice of Sherman
Act efficacy.212 Justice Blackmun was willing to accept this result in
“the domestic context,” but not in the context of an international
transaction.213 Because comity among nations warrants a particular
regard for enforcing forum-selection and arbitration clauses in
transnational agreements, and because the United States has agreed
to abide by such obligations through an international convention, the
FAA policy was unusually compelling in the transnational context.214
The Court also concluded that arbitration would not impair Sherman
Act policy or the efficacy of the treble damages deterrent and insisted
on the authority of courts to review arbitral awards after the fact to
assure themselves that appropriate laws had been applied.215

that § 1983 is designed to safeguard.”); Barrentive v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S.
728, 745 (1981) (“[T]he FLSA rights petitioners seek to assist in this action are independent of
the collective-bargaining process.”).
209. 473 U.S. 614, 619-20 (1985).
210. Id. at 646-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The plain language of this statute . . . does not
encompass a claim arising under federal law.”).
211. Id. at 627-28.
212. Cf. Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968).
The Supreme Court reviewed and rejected this doctrine in Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628-35.
213. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (“Yet the potential of these [international] tribunals for
efficient disposition of legal disagreements arising from commercial relations has not yet been
tested.”).
214. Id. at 629-32.
215. Id. at 638-39. The dissenting Justices disagreed vigorously, presenting both factual and
legal arguments. Id. at 651-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that the “importance” of
antitrust cases, as seen through the history of antitrust enforcement in the United States,
requires the rejection of the idea that “Congress would tolerate private arbitration” of these
disputes).
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Supreme Court decisions after Mitsubishi have revealed a
judicial tilt in the FAA cases that is different from the tilt before 1985:
the current Court is more insistent that the FAA reflects a critically
important national policy and less likely to find inconsistency
between arbitration and federal statutory schemes.216 Consistent with
super-statute theory, the burden is on the party resisting the FAA to
show that a competing statutory scheme is inconsistent with the
arbitral remedy. “These cases demonstrate that even claims arising
under a statute designed to further important social policies may be
arbitrated because so long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,
the statute serves its functions.”217 All of the cases cited had dissenting
opinions, but the dissenting Justices argued from within the superstatute paradigm: the central principle of the FAA is not implicated
when a repeat player uses a boilerplate arbitration clause to gain an
“unfair” advantage over consumers or to discourage useful
litigation.218
This line of cases, where super-statutes have been in conflict,
suggests that a comparative impairment approach will often depend
on factual assumptions and legal priorities extrinsic to our basic
theory. For example, one might read Mitsubishi as reflecting the
Court’s great—and according to the dissenters misplaced—
confidence that international arbitration can accommodate Sherman
Act concerns. One can also crudely contrast Gardner-Denver with
Mitsubishi along ideological lines: the Warren and early Burger
Courts valued substantive super-statutes above the FAA, but the late
Burger and Rehnquist Courts have valued the FAA more and the
substantive statutes less. Our comparative impairment idea,
therefore, merely suggests a framework for analysis and not a
predetermined conclusion.

216. E.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)
(“[T]he right to select the judicial forum and the wider choice of courts are not such essential
features of the Securities Act that § 14 [of the Act] is properly construed to bar any waiver of
these provisions.”); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987)
(concluding that there is “no basis for concluding that Congress intended to prevent
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate RICO claims” and narrowing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427 (1953)); id. at 229 (“Wilko must be read as barring waiver of judicial forum only where
arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue.”).
217. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 121 S. Ct. 513, 521 (2000) (quotations
omitted).
218. E.g., id. at 523-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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D. Quasi-Constitutional Law: Putative Constitutions, Super-Statutes,
and Clear-Statement Rules
The idea of super-statutes is related to three other phenomena in
law. We have already mentioned one phenomenon—the common
law, which even today remains a pervasive background of legal rules
and policies to which courts will turn to fill in statutory gaps or
resolve ambiguities.219 This was the role played by the common law in
Faragher and Ellerth, for example. Some judges and commentators
would read the common law to include the law of nations, which
would expand its relevance for statutory law even further.220 For
example, Chief Justice John Marshall not only interpreted but also
openly rewrote early federal statutes to reflect baselines drawn from
the law of nations.221 The Supreme Court of Canada is the most
sophisticated court in the western hemisphere in this regard, for the
Canadian Justices read both statutory and Charter provisions in light
of international law and multilateral conventions entered into by our
neighbor to the north.222 The assumption in learned circles is that the
current U.S. Supreme Court, sooner or later, will follow this
transnational trend.
A second phenomenon is that many of the substantive canons of
construction—such as the rule of lenity and the rule against sovereign
immunity waivers—are animated by constitutional principles and
policies. Thus, when a court refuses to apply a criminal statute
219. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text; see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527
U.S. 526, 537-45 (1999) (recognizing common law principles of punitive damages as an
appropriate basis for creating standards for such damages under the 1991 Amendments to the
Civil Rights Act).
220. E.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 80 (1804):
The law of nations in war, gives not only the right to search a neutral, but a right to
recapture from the enemy. On this point the [common law] case of Talbot v. Seeman
is decisive, both as to the law of nations, and as to the acts of Congress, and that the
rule applies as well to a partial as to a general war.
see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900):
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction . . . . For this purpose, where there is no
treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the
works of jurists and commentators.
221. E.g., Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801) (“[T]he laws of the United States
ought not, if be avoidable, so to be construed as to infract the common principles and usages of
nations, or the general doctrines of national law.”).
222. E.g., Her Majesty The Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (upholding a hate
speech statute, in part based on treaties committing Canada to protecting victims of racism and
misogyny).
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beyond the prototypical meaning of its terms, the court is
implementing the due process idea that criminals should have clear
notice that their conduct is unlawful and the nondelegation idea that
the legislature and not the courts should update criminal laws.223 Even
if the application of the statute to a particular criminal would be
constitutional, courts will often trim back the fuzzy margins of penal
laws in this way. The sovereign immunity canon has a common law
origin but also reflects separation of powers concerns.
A third phenomenon is that polities without written constitutions
sometimes adopt super-statutes that recognize and protect important
civil and other rights. The pre-Charter Bill of Rights in Canada, the
Human Rights Act of 1977 in the District of Columbia, and the new
Bill of Rights adopted in the United Kingdom are examples of this
kind of statute. These statutes were adopted through the normal
legislative process and do not pretend to have the trumping power
that a constitution does, but they reflect important principles widely
accepted within the polity and are expected to be interpreted liberally
and imperially.224 Although U.S. super-statutes adopted in a polity
that has a Constitution are differently situated than D.C. or U.K.
super-statutes, which do not compete with a constitution, the
similarities are more striking.225
The common law and the law of nations, constitutional and
common law canons, and super-statutes are certainly different from
one another: the first is judge-made law that the legislature can
override or ignore, the second is a body of interpretive precepts
applicable to statutes the legislature enacts, and the third is adopted
by the legislature but implemented by agencies and judges. What they
have in common is that they form a normative backdrop, influencing
223. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345
(analyzing and criticizing due process and nondelegation principles as bases for the rule of
lenity).
224. For example, the committee report for the D.C. Human Rights Act stated that it would
“underscore the Council’s intent that the elimination of discrimination within the District of
Columbia should have the highest priority and that the Human Rights Act should therefore be
read in harmony with and as supplementing other laws of the District.” COMM. ON PUB. SERVS.
& CONSUMER AFFAIRS, D.C. COUNCIL, REPORT ON BILL NO. 2-179, THE HUMAN RIGHTS
ACT OF 1977, at 3 (1977) (emphasis added), quoted in Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d
307, 319 (D.C. App. 1995).
225. The analogy is a little complicated. D.C. law, of course, can be reviewed for consistency
with the U.S. Constitution, and U.K. law can be reviewed for consistency with the Treaty of
Amsterdam and other conventions setting forth the terms of the European Union. Our point is
only that the D.C. Council or the U.K. Parliament are not directly subject to city or national
constitutions.
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the way statutes are read and applied; they constitute background
principles without which statutory interpretation ought not proceed.226
These background principles might be called “fundamental law,”
reflecting their kinship to ideas about interpretation held by the early
English writers such as Bacon and Hale. They might also be called
“quasi-constitutional law,”227 the term we prefer for the following
reason.
American lawyers and political scientists have dichotomized
American law between the “higher lawmaking” entailed in the
Constitution and “ordinary lawmaking” entailed in statutes. Part of
our project is to break down this dichotomy, which is intellectually
reminiscent of Blackstone’s dichotomy between the common law
(normative fabric) and statutes (intrusions tolerated at best). In the
modern regulatory state, the fundamental normative debate
associated with constitutionalism now frequently occurs in connection
with statutory proposals and applications. For example, gay rights
discourse has been thin and ill-informed in constitutional litigation,
but much richer in legislative and administrative deliberations, a
phenomenon illustrated by the Vermont Civil Unions Law of 2000.228
Well-informed legislators and agencies now have much to contribute
to these debates on their merits, and the legitimacy of their
contributions is particularly compelling because of their greater
connection to “We the People” than judges enjoy. As a normative
matter, we urge that super-statutes be considered something more
than ordinary lawmaking.
The foregoing proposition is relatively easy to sustain. More
controversial, but no less compelling in our view, is the proposition
that super-statutes are the most legitimate form of quasi226. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 507-08 (1989) (proposing principles for statutory interpretation in the regulatory state,
albeit many of which are not supported by the Supreme Court’s current case law).
227. We used that term in discussing the Court’s super-strong canons in William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (observing that the Supreme
Court has created a domain of “quasi-constitutional law” in certain areas by adopting superstrong clear-statement rules “to confine Congress’s power in areas in which Congress has the
constitutional power to do virtually anything”). Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé has used the
term to refer to Canadian super-statutes. E.g., Québec Inc. v. Quebec (Régie des permis
d’alcohol), [1996] S.C.R. 919, 923 (Can.) (stating that the Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms “has legal preeminence over common law because of its quasi-constitutional status”).
228. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE
OF GAY RIGHTS ch. 2 (forthcoming 2001) (tracing the deliberations leading to Vermont’s
recognition of same-sex unions by statute).
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constitutional law in the modern administrative state politically
grounded upon popular sovereignty. The common law remains a
perfectly appropriate source of lore and gapfilling rules, but no longer
as a source of fundamental trumping or norm-bending law. More
important, the Supreme Court’s episodic application of super-strong
clear-statement rules—often formulated or applied in a novel way—is
a form of higher lawmaking that ought to be curtailed or deployed
more cautiously. Certainly, these rules ought not trump superstatutes, as they did in Aramco and as they might in a domestic
version of Mitsubishi.
E. Super-Statutes as a Mediation Between the Difficulty of Amending
the U.S. Constitution and the Legitimizing Concept of Popular
Sovereignty
There is a potentially deeper relationship between superstatutory and constitutional law in our country, and it has to do with
the way the Constitution changes. Compared with the constitutions of
other nations and of our own states, the U.S. Constitution is
relatively—and exceedingly—short, old, and difficult to change
through the formal Article V process.229 These three facts about the
Constitution have supported its updating through dynamic judicial
interpretation of its provisions. The Constitution’s brevity entailed a
commitment of its drafters to establishing the structure of
government and several standards for its operation, rather than a set
of detailed rules. Accordingly, the document did not settle all the
public law issues that vexed the founding generation. The number of
issues not squarely resolved by the document has, of course, only
increased over time. That the Constitution is old means that it will not
have contemplated modern problems that beset our democracy,
ranging from intrusive technologies for government spying on its
citizens to normative debates about the morality of contraception and
abortion. After several generations of episodic intervention, the
Supreme Court by the late nineteenth century stepped forward to
settle most of these issues, and resolution by the Court has proven

229. This proposition is documented in Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional
Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 248-49, 254-67 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION].
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easier for our system than the bulky process of formal constitutional
amendment entailed by Article V.230
In order for any constitution to be enduring, it must be dynamic.
Given the particular characteristics of our Constitution—its reliance
on standards rather than rules and the difficulty of amending it
through the formal process—the dynamism seems, at first blush,
formally to have operated through judicial updating. This perception
of judicial updating has called forth thousands of articles and books
justifying or indicting or seeking to define the limits of judicial
review.231 One criticism of judicial review is that it supplants or drains
energy from popular (“We the People”) participation in
governance.232 Many theorists have tackled the problem of reconciling
the Constitution’s meta-principle of popular sovereignty with the
apparent reality of extensive and hard-to-check constitutional
lawmaking by unelected judges. Consider one important author.
Bruce Ackerman maintains that Article V’s rule of recognition is
not necessary to change the Constitution even in a formal sense.
Really fundamental constitutional enactments can occur outside the
Article V procedures in special periods—constitutional moments—
when the whole people are engaged and attentive to the
establishment of a new constitutional ordering.233 For Ackerman,
what is crucial is not a detailed set of institutional requirements, but
230. Contrast the first fifteen amendments to the Constitution, added from 1791 to 1870,
with the last twelve. The first fifteen are strongly substantive protections, including the Bill of
Rights and the polity-transforming Reconstruction amendments. During this period, the
Supreme Court rarely struck down federal laws pursuant to its power of judicial review. The last
twelve, adopted between 1913 and 1992, are overwhelmingly procedural and tinkering
amendments—except for the Eighteenth (Prohibition), which was overridden by the TwentyFirst. It is during this period that the Court has exercised its power to review federal laws and
done so with increasing bite.
231. The viewpoints of these articles and books range from the permissive review stance of
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893), to the more activist stance of JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
232. E.g., JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103-07 (De Capo Press 1974)
(1901):
[J]udging to disregard unconstitutional legislation . . . is always attended with a
serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the
outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education
and stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and
correcting their own errors.
233. BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 10 (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 72
(1998). The theory is wonderfully digested in Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 229, at 63-88.
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the purpose served by such requirements: that the people, responding
to a crisis pitting one institution against others, are engaged actively
and purposively in reshaping the constitutional order. Whether or not
they meet the Article V requirements, fundamental constitutional
enactments, according to Ackerman’s theory, ought to attract great
deference from courts because they effect a change in the
constitutional text, guided by deeply held principles of political
morality, and because they are put in place deliberately by an aroused
and serious public.
An extension of Ackerman’s theory would be to view superstatutes as statutory moments. Thus, the Civil Rights Act can be read
as a showdown between a normatively engaged political coalition in
Congress and the determined southern Democrats in the Senate, who
had repeatedly blocked antidiscrimination legislation during the
Eisenhower administration. The election of 1960 offered proponents
an opportunity to break this impasse, as it brought to power the
Kennedy-Johnson administration, which pushed hard for civil rights
legislation. In 1962-63, the debate over the civil rights bill engaged the
entire country, with religious, business, and union groups joining civil
rights groups in pressing for the adoption of this important legislation.
The determined southern opposition was decisively defeated by a
coalition assembled by President Lyndon B. Johnson and Senate
Majority Whip Hubert Humphrey. In the election that immediately
followed in 1964, Johnson (with Humphrey as his running mate) won
a great landslide over a Republican who had voted against the Act for
reasons of “states’ rights.” This scenario roughly follows Ackerman’s
formula for higher lawmaking, whereby the people are engaged in
constitutional moments.234 “We the People” have arguably endorsed
civil rights over states’ rights—a principle that has altered policy as
well as constitutional discourse ever since. The year 1964 might be
regarded as a statutory moment permanently altering the normative
foundations of public discourse.
234. Ackerman’s formula is this:
Interbranch impasse
Decisive election
branch Switch in time

Æ

Æ

Æ Reformist challenge to conservative

ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 233, at 49-50. Thus, the Civil Rights Act as a statutory
moment might look something like this:
Interbranch impasse on civil rights legislation during the Eisenhower administration,
with the Senate blocking it
Decisive election of Kennedy-Johnson in 1960
Kennedy-Johnson reformist challenge to conservative branch (Senate), with 1963-64
civil rights bill
Switch in time, when the Senate finally breaks the Southern
filibuster in 1964

Æ

Æ

Æ
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The idea of statutory moments along Ackermanian lines is a neat
project, but our super-statues idea is broader still. Descriptively, the
main difference between a concept of statutory moments and our
notion of super-statutes is that the latter acquire their normative force
through a series of public confrontations and debates over time and
not through a single stylized dramatic confrontation. Thus, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which was enacted in a particularly dramatic and
publicly absorbing way, acquired only some of its normative force in
1964. The Act immediately transformed public culture in some ways
but not in others. To take the most obvious example of the latter, the
law did little to transform the workplace for women, but a series of
public debates and confrontations in the 1970s and 1980s yielded
consensus that the antidiscrimination principle ought to have bite for
women in the workplace—and that the bite entailed protections
against discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and sexual
harassment in the workplace. The super-statute evolved through a
series of debates and confrontations. One can call each of them a
statutory moment, but few of such moments meet the Ackermanian
model as well as the Civil Rights Act does,235 and none engaged the
public at the high level they were engaged in 1963-64.
Consider the following diagram as a rough model of how superstatutes evolve:
Responding to an important problem and after careful deliberation,
Congress enacts a statute
↓
Statute is implemented by judges and/or agencies, with feedback
from Congress
↓
Normative conflict, where one institution seeks to narrow the statute
in a major way
• Legislature bows to pressure to create special-interest exceptions
• Court narrowly construes the statute
• Agency is captured by the regulated group or a special interest
↓

235. For example, the extension of Title VII to protect against pregnancy-based
discrimination can be modeled in this way:
Supreme Court construes Title VII to be inapplicable to pregnancy-based
discrimination in Gilbert v. General Electric Co.
Public campaign resulting in
congressional repudiation of Gilbert with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Court
backs down and applies PDA vigorously

Æ

Æ
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Public debate about the attempted narrowing
• Critical outrage seeking to engage the public
• Institutional opposition
• Statutory narrowing may become an election issue
↓
Responsive to the normative debate, the government reaffirms or
modifies the core principle of the statute
↓
More crises, especially as the statute is adapted to ever newer
circumstances

As does Ackerman, we understand lasting public norms to grow out
of conflict. Unlike Ackerman, we also understand lasting public
norms to form under conditions of consensus. Also unlike his theory,
ours emphasizes evolution rather than revolution. A super-statute is
not a moment, nor is it even a series of moments. Rather, it is a
continuing process of deliberation, consensus-building as to some
issues, conflict as to other issues.
The foregoing is our descriptive theory of how super-statutes
evolve and affect American public law. Consider, finally, our
prescriptive account of why super-statutes are a better way for public
law to evolve than either formal constitutional amendments,
constitutional moments, or unconstrained judicial review.
F. Super-Statutes as a Normatively Attractive Way That (Quasi)
Constitutional Norms Evolve
The structure of our short, old, and hard-to-amend Constitution
makes its dynamic interpretation inevitable—but does not assure a
jurocracy. We think a jurocracy would be terrible.236 Furthermore, it is
super-statutes instead of constitutional moments that not only save us
from a jurocracy but also replicate the legitimacy-enhancing features
of Article V. Recall that Article V does not entail a popular vote on
constitutional amendments, and so the legitimacy of changes to the
Constitution is not directly popular. Because amendments must
normally be adopted by supermajorities in Congress and then ratified
by three-quarters of the states, they entail a lengthy deliberative
process, and their animating principles must be broadly acceptable on
236. For a different but powerful critique of judicial review and the disadvantages of even a
limited jurocracy, see, for example, GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (answering the question posed by the book’s title in
the negative).
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their merits. That lengthy deliberative process and the requirement of
a robust principle give constitutional amendments a legitimacy that
both augments and transcends the rule of recognition available under
Article V.
The genius of Ackerman’s constitutional moments theory is that
it exploits the legitimacy-enhancing features of Article V
(deliberation about an important principle) and makes it operate
without the now-unworkable Article V apparatus. Notwithstanding
its genius, the theory may in fact sacrifice popular sovereignty for the
sake of constitutional updating. For example, if Ackerman is read as
requiring a constitutional moment as a precondition for real
constitutional change, then his theory entails a narrow reading of
some constitutional changes. (This is particularly true if his theory
entails a narrow reading of some constitutional amendments, such as
the Eleventh Amendment, that actually went through the Article V
process.) Although there have been twenty-seven formal
amendments to the Constitution, Ackerman identifies only three
constitutional moments. In Ackerman’s world, it is not clear how
judges are constrained during the long periods between constitutional
moments. The primary constraint seems to be the moral obligation of
judges to engage in a process of synthesis, by which judges reconcile
earlier versions of the Constitution (the Founding, Reconstruction)
with the changes wrought by the most recent constitutional moment
(the New Deal and the Switch in Time). This methodology does not
strike us as a very constraining one.237 If that is the case, Ackermanian
judges can govern relatively unchecked for long periods of time, with
no reason to fear popular intervention.
The tension between the desirability of normative updating and
the need for it to be legitimate along lines of popular sovereignty is a
pervasive problem for modern representative democracies. The
United States is unusual in requiring constitutional change to traverse
so many potential roadblocks. In many other countries, constitutional
lawmaking does not require either supermajorities or the assent of
other governmental institutions or the people through referenda, but
237. An attractive example of synthesis is Ackerman’s defense of Brown along these lines.
Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 531-36 (1989)
(arguing that Brown “turns on the crucial synthetic point: Twentieth-century developments
since Plessy have undermined the interpretive premises that informed [the Plessy] reading of
‘equal protection’”). The synthesis Ackerman suggests works only because we all share an
admiration for Brown that was hard-earned. Synthesis as a methodology seems unlikely to be an
effective constraint on judges.
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only the repeated agreement by successive parliaments.238 The
normative advantage of such lawmaking is that it is not so difficult
that it cannot be accomplished in the face of strong objection, yet the
procedures (long deliberative history, repeated endorsement by
differently constituted legislatures, multiple opportunities for critique
and public feedback) vest its results with a great deal of legitimacy.
This notion de-emphasizes the “momentary” aspect of constitutional
of quasi-constitutional lawmaking. One reason for such a stance is
that critical moments are as likely to be temporary and governed by
passions as they are to be lasting and ruled by reason. Fundamental
principles requiring constitutional protection are more likely to be
discovered when the political process takes a more sober and
reflective aspect. The point is that constitutional legislation is both
principled and deliberative, even if it is not produced in a defined
historical moment involving a normative showdown.
To the extent that such iterated legislation also reflects (or comes
to reflect) a fundamental principle, it will sometimes be the functional
equivalent of a super-statute. Correlatively, the super-statute idea
shares the virtues of this kind of constitutional lawmaking: it is both a
feasible and legitimate way for new fundamental principles to work
their way into public law. A super-statute embodies a fundamental
principle that has a claim to be deeply embedded in our national
aspirations. One test of a super-statute is that whatever the
circumstances of its enactment, it instantiates a principle that passes
the test of time: it works, it appeals to multiple generations, and it
sticks in the public culture. Accordingly, super-statutes also satisfy a
strong deliberative test and a different kind of test from a statutorymoments kind of model. Typically super-statutes are extensively
relied upon by the people and are repeatedly visited and endorsed by
legislative, administrative, and judicial institutions in response to the
actions taken by private as well as public actors. In that respect,
super-statutes are not only expressions of deeply held principle but
are also shaped by the realities of administrative implementation and
in light of repeated litigation and new legislation. In this respect, the
general principle embodied in a super-statutory regime is revisited
and recrafted in light of experience. Such experience is necessary to
fit the super-statute into the broader landscape of political principles
reflected in the constitutional order. Also, because super-statutes
grow and evolve through institutional conflicts, there is often a
238.

Lutz, supra note 229, at 263.
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charged normative debate that makes the statute’s principle
transparent to the populace and draws many citizens into the debate.
The absence of super-majoritarian requirements and the lack of
formal requirements of state government approval are part of the
attraction of the super-statute. Super-statutes reflect deliberative
majority judgments in a way that countermajoritarian constitutional
law cannot. In the face of a determined and stable majority, small,
geographically concentrated minorities are not accorded the veto
right they are given by Article V procedures.239 Super-statutes have a
claim to expression of the considered judgment of the nation as a
whole. Although according quasi-constitutional status to expressions
of majority will does risk injury to disadvantaged minorities, the fact
that Congress, the Court, and agencies repeatedly revisit and revise
the super-statutes in light of constitutional protections ensures that
minority rights will not be lightly overridden in a super-statutory
regime. In the end, if a super-statutory regime regularly violates
constitutionally protected minority rights, it can be overturned by
Congress or the courts.
We have put forward a different model of deliberation than is
found either in standard constitutional theory or in Ackerman. Our
model emphasizes dispassionate consideration of circumstances of
injustice and careful, experimental attempts to ameliorate such
circumstances. Such efforts at improvement need to draw from all the
strengths of our democracy. We need the thoughtfulness of judges,
the enthusiasm of interest groups, the policy expertise of agencies,
and the moral concern (and sometimes outrage) of the people and
their representatives. How these are to be integrated is a matter of
meta-constitutional choice. Our Constitution, at least as it is read by
most lawyers, imposes a kind of rigid hierarchical mode of
integration—the people, their representatives, and their delegates
make policy under the shadow of the Constitution. The problem with
such a model is the Platonic one: the Constitution is interpreted by
239. Consider this thought experiment. Could the Civil Rights Act’s antidiscrimination
principle have been adopted by a constitutional amendment? It is almost inconceivable under
Article V that it could be: the eleven states of the former Confederacy would never have ratified
because their societies were built upon apartheid; it is doubtful that many of the six border
states, all with either apartheid laws or local practices, would have ratified; other states, such as
those in the West or plains, might not have ratified for reasons of apathy; and even
antidiscrimination states would have faced tough arguments about whether the Constitution
should prohibit private discrimination. As the experience with the Equal Rights Amendment
(which only applied to state action) teaches us, even the antidiscrimination norm is hard to add
to the Constitution.
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judges who have powerful reasons to interpret it in terms of their own
preferences and predilections. Given the uneven and glacial pace at
which the Court’s personnel changes, the rigidity of such a model is
obvious, as is the tectonic nature of ensuing constitutional change.
We think that this model is not very attractive. It leaves the
people and their representatives in a subordinate role and
discourages them from taking seriously their role as full citizens—as
agents who are responsible for the evils and injustices that persist
among us. It puts judges in a position for which no one is well-suited:
it encourages them, falsely, to see themselves as privileged guardians
of a received constitutional order. They are encouraged to mask their
influence on policy as the exercise of guardianship of a received
sacred order and not to see themselves as citizens, no different really
than the rest of us, who are privileged by their abilities and luck to
occupy a valuable vantage point in the policymaking process. The
judicial role is, indeed, critical to how things go but not because of
who judges are or because the people cannot be trusted to govern
themselves. Rather, the value that judges bring is that they get to see
how it is that law (super-statutes) intersects with the lives of ordinary
people and, from that perspective, to work to develop and refine the
super-statute in light of such experience. Judges can make policy
more precise, more intelligent, and more just, but they do not do
these things by themselves.
CONCLUSION: SUPER-STATUTES, LAW’S HIERARCHY OF SOURCES,
AND SOCIAL NORMS
Our project has been to identify a relatively novel way to think
about the hierarchy of sources in law. The traditional distinction
between ordinary law and higher lawmaking is not sufficiently finegrained for the modern state. There is, and long has been, an
intermediate category of fundamental or quasi-constitutional law. For
most of American history, the common law played that intermediate
role: even as it evolved in response to new phenomena and learning,
the common law filled statutory gaps, affected the application of
statutes, and influenced the evolution of constitutional law itself. The
twentieth century inaugurated an age of statutes or, as we prefer, an
era of super-statutes. It is no coincidence that the phenomena
explored in our paper was coming into focus at the point in history
when the common law fell from favor as the basis for fundamental

ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN

1276

04/30/01 4:46 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1215

law, even as judges were updating the Constitution in default of its
amendment through the formal Article V channels.
Prescriptively, super-statutes mediate the tension between
democracy or popular accountability and the evolution of higher law
at the hands of unelected judges. Our view is that super-statutes
mediate this tension more effectively than either the formal
mechanisms contained in the Constitution or leading academic
theories such as Ackerman’s. The constitutional processes would
leave higher law stagnant, and the academic theories would leave it
illegitimate. Super-statues contribute to a complex process by which
fundamental law evolves with a strong connection to the people and
popular needs. They also contribute to a complex process by which
law coheres, if not in a wholly consistent plan, at least in a roughly
consistent collection of interrelated policies and principles.
Descriptively, super-statues also relate to social norms. There is a
large literature on the topic of social norms,240 and this topic is beyond
the scope of our Essay. Much of the literature takes a Hayekian view
of social norms, as evolving through an organic process of trial and
error.241 Our view, tentative at this point, is that super-statutes both
contribute to and feed off of social norms. Laws such as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Endangered Species Act were responses
to developing social norms, yet they also did more than their part in
ensuring that those norms would stick in the entire country. The
evolution of social norms and public values relating to discrimination
has played out in political and legal activism surrounding the civil
rights law. The relationship between social norms and super-statutes
is too complex for full treatment here, but it is a relationship worth
exploring.

240. E.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000) (advocating and applying to
several areas of the law a model relationship between law and social norms in which individuals’
concern with establishing cooperative relationships leads them to behave in certain ways,
thereby generating behavioral patterns called social norms); Symposium, Law, Economics, and
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996).
241. Cf. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 754-60 (1999) (describing and vigorously
questioning the Hayekian literature).

